more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
Prima facie, it would seem that it is a least logically possible the brain state corresponding to pain should have existed (Jones's brain could have been in exactly that state at the time in question) without Jones feeling any pain at all.
Clarification
'Prima facie' means at first sight
Gist of Idea
It seems logically possible to have the pain brain state without the actual pain
Source
Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 3)
Book Ref
Kripke,Saul: 'Naming and Necessity' [Blackwell 1980], p.146
A Reaction
This is Kripke's commitment to the possibility of zombies, which are only possible if the mind-body connection is a contingent one, and he shows that there are no contingent 'identities'. The answer is necessary identity, and no zombies.
12727 | It's impossible, but imagine a body carrying on normally, but with no mind [Leibniz] |
9177 | Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke] |
4967 | It seems logically possible to have the pain brain state without the actual pain [Kripke] |
3487 | Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained [Searle] |
3288 | Can we describe our experiences to zombies? [Nagel] |
3390 | Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas? [Kim] |
3414 | What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible? [Kim] |
2413 | If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness [Chalmers] |
7061 | Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world [Heil] |
7063 | Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical [Heil] |
7064 | Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state [Heil] |