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Full Idea
From sameness of meaning there does not follow sameness of thought expressed. A fact about the Morning Star may express something different from a fact about the Evening Star, as someone may regard one as true and the other false.
Clarification
Hesperus (the evening star) and Phosphorus (the morning star) turned out to be the planet Venus
Gist of Idea
I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false
Source
Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.14)
Book Ref
Frege,Gottlob: 'Translations from the Writings of Gottlob Frege', ed/tr. Geach,P/Black,M [Blackwell 1980], p.29
A Reaction
This all gets clearer if we distinguish internalist and externalist theories of content. Why take sides on this? Why not just ask 'what is in the speaker's head?', 'what does the sentence mean in the community?', and 'what is the corresponding situation?'
| 4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
| 4570 | Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions [Cooper,DE on Russell] |
| 8355 | Expressions don't refer; people use expressions to refer [Strawson,P] |
| 8357 | If an utterance fails to refer then it is a pseudo-use, though a speaker may think they assert something [Strawson,P] |
| 5815 | Whether a definite description is referential or attributive depends on the speaker's intention [Donnellan] |
| 10459 | Context does not create reference; it is just something speakers can exploit [Bach] |
| 10460 | 'That duck' may not refer to the most obvious one in the group [Bach] |
| 10461 | What a pronoun like 'he' refers back to is usually a matter of speaker's intentions [Bach] |
| 10462 | Information comes from knowing who is speaking, not just from interpretation of the utterance [Bach] |
| 10434 | Even a quantifier like 'someone' can be used referentially [Sainsbury] |
| 15182 | Because some entities overlap, reference must have analytic individuation principles [Sidelle] |
| 21650 | No language is semantically referential; it all occurs at the level of thought or utterance [Pietroski, by Hofweber] |