more on this theme     |     more from this thinker


Single Idea 4984

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism ]

Full Idea

All psychological statements which are meaningful, that is to say, which are in principle verifiable, are translatable into propositions which do not involve psychological concepts, but only the concepts of physics.

Gist of Idea

All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics

Source

Robert Kirk (Mind and Body [2003], §3.8)

Book Ref

Kirk,Robert: 'Mind and Body' [Acumen 2003], p.60


A Reaction

This shows how eliminativist behaviourism arises out of logical positivism (by only allowing what is verifiable). The simplest objection: we can't verify the mental states of others, because they are private, but they are still the best explanation.


The 15 ideas from 'Mind and Body'

Dualism implies some brain events with no physical cause, and others with no physical effect [Kirk,R]
A weaker kind of reductionism than direct translation is the use of 'bridge laws' [Kirk,R]
All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics [Kirk,R]
If mental states are multiply realisable, they could not be translated into physical terms [Kirk,R]
The inverted spectrum idea is often regarded as an objection to behaviourism [Kirk,R]
Behaviourism seems a good theory for intentional states, but bad for phenomenal ones [Kirk,R]
In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions [Kirk,R]
If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm [Kirk,R]
Behaviourism offers a good alternative to simplistic unitary accounts of mental relationships [Kirk,R]
Behaviourists doubt whether reference is a single type of relation [Kirk,R]
Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal [Kirk,R]
It seems unlikely that most concepts are innate, if a theory must be understood to grasp them [Kirk,R]
Instead of representation by sentences, it can be by a distribution of connectionist strengths [Kirk,R]
For behaviourists language is just a special kind of behaviour [Kirk,R]
Maybe we should see intentionality and consciousness as a single problem, not two [Kirk,R]