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Single Idea 4986

[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction ]

Full Idea

If multiple realisability means that psychological terms cannot be translated into physics, one weaker kind of reductionism resorts to 'bridge laws' which link the theory to be reduced to the reducing theory.

Gist of Idea

A weaker kind of reductionism than direct translation is the use of 'bridge laws'

Source

Robert Kirk (Mind and Body [2003], §3.8)

Book Ref

Kirk,Robert: 'Mind and Body' [Acumen 2003], p.61

A Reaction

It seems to me that reduction is all-or-nothing, so there can't be a 'weaker' kind. If they are totally separate but linked by naturally necessary laws (e.g. low temperature and ice), they are supervenient, but not reducible to one another.

The 15 ideas from Robert Kirk

4982 Dualism implies some brain events with no physical cause, and others with no physical effect [Kirk,R]
4986 A weaker kind of reductionism than direct translation is the use of 'bridge laws' [Kirk,R]
4984 All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics [Kirk,R]
4985 If mental states are multiply realisable, they could not be translated into physical terms [Kirk,R]
4990 The inverted spectrum idea is often regarded as an objection to behaviourism [Kirk,R]
4991 Behaviourism seems a good theory for intentional states, but bad for phenomenal ones [Kirk,R]
4992 In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions [Kirk,R]
4993 If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm [Kirk,R]
4994 Behaviourism offers a good alternative to simplistic unitary accounts of mental relationships [Kirk,R]
4995 Behaviourists doubt whether reference is a single type of relation [Kirk,R]
5000 Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal [Kirk,R]
4997 It seems unlikely that most concepts are innate, if a theory must be understood to grasp them [Kirk,R]
4998 Instead of representation by sentences, it can be by a distribution of connectionist strengths [Kirk,R]
4999 For behaviourists language is just a special kind of behaviour [Kirk,R]
5001 Maybe we should see intentionality and consciousness as a single problem, not two [Kirk,R]