more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
For many kinds of mental states, notably intentional ones such as beliefs and desires, behaviourism is appealing, ..but for sensations and experiences such as pain, it seems grossly implausible.
Gist of Idea
Behaviourism seems a good theory for intentional states, but bad for phenomenal ones
Source
Robert Kirk (Mind and Body [2003], §5.1)
Book Ref
Kirk,Robert: 'Mind and Body' [Acumen 2003], p.100
A Reaction
The theory does indeed make a bit more sense for intentional states, but it still strikes me as nonsense that there is no more to my belief that 'Whales live in the Atlantic' than a disposition to say something. WHY do I say this something?
| 7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 3369 | Logical behaviourism translates mental language to behavioural [Kim] |
| 3428 | Behaviourism reduces mind to behaviour via bridging principles [Kim] |
| 4991 | Behaviourism seems a good theory for intentional states, but bad for phenomenal ones [Kirk,R] |
| 4994 | Behaviourism offers a good alternative to simplistic unitary accounts of mental relationships [Kirk,R] |
| 3165 | Behaviourism is eliminative, or reductionist, or methodological [Rey] |
| 3180 | Maybe behaviourists should define mental states as a group [Rey] |