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Single Idea 4992

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour ]

Full Idea

There is a non-reductive version of behaviourism ( which we can call 'global' or 'holistic') which says there is no more to having mental states than having a complex of certain kinds of behavioural dispositions.

Gist of Idea

In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions

Source

Robert Kirk (Mind and Body [2003], §5.2)

Book Ref

Kirk,Robert: 'Mind and Body' [Acumen 2003], p.103

A Reaction

This is designed to meet a standard objection to behaviourism - that there is no straight correlation between what I think and how I behave. The present theory is obviously untestable, because a full 'complex' of human dispositions is never repeated.

The 15 ideas from Robert Kirk

4982 Dualism implies some brain events with no physical cause, and others with no physical effect [Kirk,R]
4986 A weaker kind of reductionism than direct translation is the use of 'bridge laws' [Kirk,R]
4984 All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics [Kirk,R]
4985 If mental states are multiply realisable, they could not be translated into physical terms [Kirk,R]
4990 The inverted spectrum idea is often regarded as an objection to behaviourism [Kirk,R]
4991 Behaviourism seems a good theory for intentional states, but bad for phenomenal ones [Kirk,R]
4992 In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions [Kirk,R]
4993 If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm [Kirk,R]
4994 Behaviourism offers a good alternative to simplistic unitary accounts of mental relationships [Kirk,R]
4995 Behaviourists doubt whether reference is a single type of relation [Kirk,R]
5000 Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal [Kirk,R]
4997 It seems unlikely that most concepts are innate, if a theory must be understood to grasp them [Kirk,R]
4998 Instead of representation by sentences, it can be by a distribution of connectionist strengths [Kirk,R]
4999 For behaviourists language is just a special kind of behaviour [Kirk,R]
5001 Maybe we should see intentionality and consciousness as a single problem, not two [Kirk,R]