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Single Idea 4993

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality ]

Full Idea

When a bird pulls a worm from the ground, then swallows it piece by piece, there is a sense in which its behaviour can be said to be about the worm.

Gist of Idea

If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm

Source

Robert Kirk (Mind and Body [2003], §5.4)

Book Ref

Kirk,Robert: 'Mind and Body' [Acumen 2003], p.104


A Reaction

This is preparing the ground for a possible behaviourist account of intentionality. Reply: you could say rain is about puddles, or you could say we have adopted Dennett's 'intentional stance' to birds, but it tells us nothing about their psychology.


The 17 ideas with the same theme [what exactly is intentionality?]:

All mental phenomena contain an object [Brentano]
Intentionality defines, transcends and unites consciousness [Sartre]
Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it [Searle]
Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality [Searle]
Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background [Searle]
Both thought and language have intentionality [Kim]
Do intentional states explain our behaviour? [Fodor]
How does anything get outside itself? [Fodor, by Martin,CB]
If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm [Kirk,R]
Physical powers like solubility and charge also have directedness [Molnar]
Intentionality comes in degrees [Lycan]
If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H]
Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes [Crane]
Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes [Crane]
Propositional attitudes are not the only intentional states; there is also mental imagery [Heil]
Dreams and imagery show the brain can generate awareness and meaning without input [Edelman/Tononi]
Intentionality is too superficial to appear in the catalogue of ultimate physics [Sider]