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Single Idea 4999

[filed under theme 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification ]

Full Idea

Behaviourists regard the use of language as just a special kind of behaviour.

Gist of Idea

For behaviourists language is just a special kind of behaviour

Source

Robert Kirk (Mind and Body [2003], §7.9)

Book Ref

Kirk,Robert: 'Mind and Body' [Acumen 2003], p.155


A Reaction

This is not an intuitively obvious view of language. We behave, and then we talk about behaviour. Performative utterances (like promising) have an obvious behavioural aspect, as do violent threats, but not highly theoretical language (such as maths).


The 15 ideas from Robert Kirk

Dualism implies some brain events with no physical cause, and others with no physical effect [Kirk,R]
A weaker kind of reductionism than direct translation is the use of 'bridge laws' [Kirk,R]
All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics [Kirk,R]
If mental states are multiply realisable, they could not be translated into physical terms [Kirk,R]
The inverted spectrum idea is often regarded as an objection to behaviourism [Kirk,R]
Behaviourism seems a good theory for intentional states, but bad for phenomenal ones [Kirk,R]
In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions [Kirk,R]
If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm [Kirk,R]
Behaviourism offers a good alternative to simplistic unitary accounts of mental relationships [Kirk,R]
Behaviourists doubt whether reference is a single type of relation [Kirk,R]
Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal [Kirk,R]
It seems unlikely that most concepts are innate, if a theory must be understood to grasp them [Kirk,R]
Instead of representation by sentences, it can be by a distribution of connectionist strengths [Kirk,R]
For behaviourists language is just a special kind of behaviour [Kirk,R]
Maybe we should see intentionality and consciousness as a single problem, not two [Kirk,R]