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Single Idea 5000
[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
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Full Idea
The conflict over whether intentionality is a matter of behavioural relations with the rest of the world, or of the internal states of the subject, is at its most dramatic in the contrast between behaviourism and the language of thought hypothesis.
Gist of Idea
Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal
Source
Robert Kirk (Mind and Body [2003], §7.10)
Book Ref
Kirk,Robert: 'Mind and Body' [Acumen 2003], p.158
A Reaction
I just don't believe any behaviourist external account of intentionality, which ducks the question of how it all works. Personally I am more drawn to maps and models than to a language of thought. I plan my actions in an imagined space-time world.
The
15 ideas
from 'Mind and Body'
4982
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Dualism implies some brain events with no physical cause, and others with no physical effect
[Kirk,R]
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4986
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A weaker kind of reductionism than direct translation is the use of 'bridge laws'
[Kirk,R]
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4984
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All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics
[Kirk,R]
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4985
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If mental states are multiply realisable, they could not be translated into physical terms
[Kirk,R]
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4990
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The inverted spectrum idea is often regarded as an objection to behaviourism
[Kirk,R]
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4991
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Behaviourism seems a good theory for intentional states, but bad for phenomenal ones
[Kirk,R]
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4992
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In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions
[Kirk,R]
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4993
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If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm
[Kirk,R]
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4994
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Behaviourism offers a good alternative to simplistic unitary accounts of mental relationships
[Kirk,R]
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4995
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Behaviourists doubt whether reference is a single type of relation
[Kirk,R]
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5000
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Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal
[Kirk,R]
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4997
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It seems unlikely that most concepts are innate, if a theory must be understood to grasp them
[Kirk,R]
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4998
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Instead of representation by sentences, it can be by a distribution of connectionist strengths
[Kirk,R]
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4999
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For behaviourists language is just a special kind of behaviour
[Kirk,R]
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5001
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Maybe we should see intentionality and consciousness as a single problem, not two
[Kirk,R]
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