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Single Idea 5001
[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
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Full Idea
Many philosophers today have adopted the view that we can achieve an enormous simplification by reducing the two components of the mind-body problem - intentionality and consciousness - into one; ...consciousness is no more than representations.
Gist of Idea
Maybe we should see intentionality and consciousness as a single problem, not two
Source
Robert Kirk (Mind and Body [2003], §8.4)
Book Ref
Kirk,Robert: 'Mind and Body' [Acumen 2003], p.167
A Reaction
One would then see subjective experience and informational content as two consequences of a single mental activity. This strikes me as the correct route to go. We do, after all, learn BY experiencing. Hence concepts are tied in with qualia.
The
15 ideas
from 'Mind and Body'
4982
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Dualism implies some brain events with no physical cause, and others with no physical effect
[Kirk,R]
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4986
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A weaker kind of reductionism than direct translation is the use of 'bridge laws'
[Kirk,R]
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4984
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All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics
[Kirk,R]
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4985
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If mental states are multiply realisable, they could not be translated into physical terms
[Kirk,R]
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4990
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The inverted spectrum idea is often regarded as an objection to behaviourism
[Kirk,R]
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4991
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Behaviourism seems a good theory for intentional states, but bad for phenomenal ones
[Kirk,R]
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4992
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In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions
[Kirk,R]
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4993
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If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm
[Kirk,R]
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4994
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Behaviourism offers a good alternative to simplistic unitary accounts of mental relationships
[Kirk,R]
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4995
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Behaviourists doubt whether reference is a single type of relation
[Kirk,R]
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5000
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Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal
[Kirk,R]
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4997
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It seems unlikely that most concepts are innate, if a theory must be understood to grasp them
[Kirk,R]
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4998
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Instead of representation by sentences, it can be by a distribution of connectionist strengths
[Kirk,R]
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4999
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For behaviourists language is just a special kind of behaviour
[Kirk,R]
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5001
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Maybe we should see intentionality and consciousness as a single problem, not two
[Kirk,R]
|