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Single Idea 5002
[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
]
Full Idea
Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind.
Gist of Idea
Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind
Source
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.01.19)
Book Ref
Locke,John: 'Essay Concerning Human Understanding', ed/tr. Nidditch,P.H. [OUP 1979], p.115
A Reaction
This sounds to me like one capacity of human consciousness, which is second-order awareness. I take animals to have first-order awareness (of the world), but not perception of their own awareness. Self-awareness is crucial to his concept of a 'person'.
The
16 ideas
with the same theme
[consciousness as higher levels of thinking]:
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5002
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Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind
[Locke]
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4086
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Kant thought that consciousness depends on self-consciousness ('apperception')
[Kant, by Crane]
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23190
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Consciousness is our awareness of our own mental life
[Nietzsche]
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7111
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Consciousness exists as consciousness of itself
[Sartre]
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4888
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It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them
[Perry]
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2453
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We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts
[Fodor]
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7885
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The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states
[Papineau]
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7886
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Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered
[Papineau]
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7887
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States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements
[Papineau]
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7888
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Higher-order judgements may be possible where the subject denies having been conscious
[Papineau]
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8895
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If neither the first-level nor the second-level is itself conscious, there seems to be no consciousness present
[Bonjour]
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12586
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Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it
[Peacocke]
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9320
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Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception
[Gulick]
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9321
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Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality
[Gulick]
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9322
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Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like
[Gulick]
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9314
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Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error
[Kriegel/Williford]
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