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Single Idea 5004
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
]
Full Idea
It is on the Principles, or first causes, that the knowledge of other things depends, so the Principles can be known without these last, but the other things cannot reciprocally be known without the Principles.
Gist of Idea
We can know basic Principles without further knowledge, but not the other way round
Source
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], Pref)
Book Ref
Descartes,René: 'Philosophical Essays and Correspondence', ed/tr. Ariew,Roger [Hackett 2000], p.222
A Reaction
A particularly strong assertion of foundationalism, as it says that not only must the foundations exist, but also we must actually know them. This sounds false, as elementary knowledge then seems to require far too much sophistication.
The
15 ideas
with the same theme
[contents and origin of foundational beliefs]:
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1670
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When you understand basics, you can't be persuaded to change your mind
[Aristotle]
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20795
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Some things are their own criterion, such as straightness, a set of scales, or light
[Sext.Empiricus]
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5004
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We can know basic Principles without further knowledge, but not the other way round
[Descartes]
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23245
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Knowledge can't be its own foundation; there has to be regress of higher and higher authorities
[Fichte]
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6944
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Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt
[Peirce]
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4257
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The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible
[Bonjour]
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2756
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If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom
[Dancy,J]
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8896
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Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct
[Bonjour]
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8853
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Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content
[Williams,M]
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3580
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Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations
[Williams,M]
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6353
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People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations
[Pollock/Cruz]
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6361
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Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility
[Pollock/Cruz]
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4582
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Basic beliefs are self-evident, or sensual, or intuitive, or revealed, or guaranteed
[Baggini /Fosl]
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8845
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An experience's having propositional content doesn't make it a belief
[Pryor]
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19719
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'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible
[Grundmann]
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