more from this thinker     |     more from this text

Single Idea 5015

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism ]

Full Idea

Universals arise solely from the fact that we avail ourselves of one idea in order to think of all individual things that have a certain similitude. When we understand under the same name all the objects represented by this idea, that name is universal.

Gist of Idea

A universal is a single idea applied to individual things that are similar to one another

Source

René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.59)

Book Ref

Descartes,René: 'Philosophical Essays and Correspondence', ed/tr. Ariew,Roger [Hackett 2000], p.246

A Reaction

Judging by the boldness of the pronouncement, it looks as if Descartes hasn't recognised the complexity of the problem. How do we spot a 'similarity', especially an abstraction like 'tool' or 'useful'? This sounds like Descartes trying to avoid Platonism.

The 23 ideas with the same theme [universals are groups of resembling particulars]:

5015 A universal is a single idea applied to individual things that are similar to one another [Descartes]
6714 Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars [Berkeley]
11098 Momentary impressions are wrongly identified with one another on the basis of resemblance [Hume, by Quine]
7954 If we see a resemblance among objects, we apply the same name to them, despite their differences [Hume]
23649 No one thinks two sheets possess a single whiteness, but all agree they are both white [Reid]
4441 'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal [Russell]
7956 If all and only red things were round things, we would need to specify the 'respect' of the resemblance [Goodman, by Macdonald,C]
7957 Without respects of resemblance, we would collect blue book, blue pen, red pen, red clock together [Goodman, by Macdonald,C]
8532 Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong]
4439 'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars [Armstrong]
4440 'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard [Armstrong]
8500 Colour resemblance isn't just resemblance between things; 'colour' must be mentioned [Jackson]
8521 Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else [Campbell,K]
7009 Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for [Heil]
7041 Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar [Heil]
7720 Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
9447 If properties are clusters of powers, this can explain why properties resemble in degrees [Mumford]
4458 Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes [Moreland]
9472 Resemblance itself needs explanation, presumably in terms of something held in common [Bird]
7955 Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain either new resemblances, or absence of resemblances [Macdonald,C]
18435 Resemblance Nominalists say that resemblance explains properties (not the other way round) [Rodriquez-Pereyra]
18436 Entities are truthmakers for their resemblances, so no extra entities or 'resemblances' are needed [Rodriquez-Pereyra]
18437 Resemblance nominalism requires a second entity to explain 'the rose is crimson' [Edwards]