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Single Idea 5018

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind ]

Full Idea

Even if we suppose God had united a body and a soul so closely that they couldn't be closer, and made a single thing out of the two, they would still remain distinct, because God has the power of separating them, or conserving out without the other.

Gist of Idea

Even if tightly united, mind and body are different, as God could separate them

Source

René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.60)

Book Ref

Descartes,René: 'Philosophical Essays and Correspondence', ed/tr. Ariew,Roger [Hackett 2000], p.247


A Reaction

If Descartes lost his belief in God (after discussing existence with Kant) would he cease to be a dualist? This quotation seems to be close to conceding a mind-body relationship more like supervenience than interaction.


The 19 ideas with the same theme [total mapping of thoughts onto brain events]:

Even if tightly united, mind and body are different, as God could separate them [Descartes]
Identical objects must have identical value [Ross]
Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson]
If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism [Searle]
Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston [Searle]
Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant [Searle]
Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect [Searle]
Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience [Kim]
Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction [Kim]
Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible [Kim]
Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience [Kim]
Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau]
Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau]
Supervenience gives good support for mental causation [Fodor]
Supervenience can be replaced by identifying mind with higher-order or disjunctional properties [Papineau]
If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane]
Zombies imply natural but not logical supervenience [Chalmers]
If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa) [Fine,K]
Supervenience of mental and physical properties often comes with token-identity of mental and physical particulars [Rowlands]