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Full Idea
We must distinguish between what is certain and what is necessary; everyone agrees that future contingents are certain, since God foresees them, but it is not thereby admitted that they are necessary.
Clarification
'Contingent' events might not occur
Gist of Idea
Future contingent events are certain, because God foresees them, but that doesn't make them necessary
Source
Gottfried Leibniz (Discourse on Metaphysics [1686], §13)
Book Ref
Leibniz,Gottfried: 'Philosophical Writings', ed/tr. Parkinson,G.H.R. [Dent 1973], p.23
A Reaction
An interesting point, since there is presumably a difference between God foreseeing that future squares will have four corners, and His foreseeing the next war. It seems to me, though, that 'certainty' is bad enough news for free will, without necessity.
| 7558 | Substances mirror God or the universe, each from its own viewpoint [Leibniz] |
| 2119 | People argue for God's free will, but it isn't needed if God acts in perfection following supreme reason [Leibniz] |
| 5023 | Future contingent events are certain, because God foresees them, but that doesn't make them necessary [Leibniz] |
| 12711 | The immediate cause of movements is more real [than geometry] [Leibniz] |
| 5024 | Knowledge doesn't just come from the senses; we know the self, substance, identity, being etc. [Leibniz] |
| 5025 | Mind and body can't influence one another, but God wouldn't intervene in the daily routine [Leibniz] |
| 5026 | Animals lack morality because they lack self-reflection [Leibniz] |
| 5027 | If a person's memories became totally those of the King of China, he would be the King of China [Leibniz] |
| 13088 | Subjects include predicates, so full understanding of subjects reveals all the predicates [Leibniz] |
| 13085 | Leibniz is some form of haecceitist [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 19349 | The complete notion of a substance implies all of its predicates or attributes [Leibniz] |
| 16761 | Forms are of no value in physics, but are indispensable in metaphysics [Leibniz] |
| 19342 | Reason avoids multiplying hypotheses or principles [Leibniz] |