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Single Idea 5025

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism ]

Full Idea

It is inconceivable that mind and body should have any influence on one another, and it is unreasonable simply to have recourse to the extraordinary operation of the universal cause in a matter which is ordinary and particular.

Clarification

By 'universal cause' he means God

Gist of Idea

Mind and body can't influence one another, but God wouldn't intervene in the daily routine

Source

Gottfried Leibniz (Discourse on Metaphysics [1686], §33)

Book Ref

Leibniz,Gottfried: 'Philosophical Writings', ed/tr. Parkinson,G.H.R. [Dent 1973], p.42


A Reaction

Leibniz was the ultimate intellectual contortionist! Here he is rejecting Cartesian interactionism, and also Malebranche's Occasionalism (God bridges the gap), in order to prepare for his own (daft) theory of what is now called Parallelism.


The 13 ideas from 'Discourse on Metaphysics'

Substances mirror God or the universe, each from its own viewpoint [Leibniz]
People argue for God's free will, but it isn't needed if God acts in perfection following supreme reason [Leibniz]
Future contingent events are certain, because God foresees them, but that doesn't make them necessary [Leibniz]
The immediate cause of movements is more real [than geometry] [Leibniz]
Knowledge doesn't just come from the senses; we know the self, substance, identity, being etc. [Leibniz]
Mind and body can't influence one another, but God wouldn't intervene in the daily routine [Leibniz]
Animals lack morality because they lack self-reflection [Leibniz]
If a person's memories became totally those of the King of China, he would be the King of China [Leibniz]
Subjects include predicates, so full understanding of subjects reveals all the predicates [Leibniz]
Leibniz is some form of haecceitist [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
The complete notion of a substance implies all of its predicates or attributes [Leibniz]
Forms are of no value in physics, but are indispensable in metaphysics [Leibniz]
Reason avoids multiplying hypotheses or principles [Leibniz]