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Full Idea
If certain possibles never exist, then existing things are not always necessary; otherwise it would be impossible for other things to exist instead of them, and so all things that never exist would be impossible.
Gist of Idea
If non-existents are possible, their existence would replace what now exists, which cannot therefore be necessary
Source
Gottfried Leibniz (On Freedom [1689], p.106)
Book Ref
Leibniz,Gottfried: 'Philosophical Writings', ed/tr. Parkinson,G.H.R. [Dent 1973], p.106
A Reaction
A neat argument, though it is not self-evident that when possibles came into existence they would have to replace what is already there. Can't something be possible, but only in another world, because this one is already booked?
| 17209 | A thing is contingent if nothing in its essence determines whether or not it exists [Spinoza] |
| 5039 | If non-existents are possible, their existence would replace what now exists, which cannot therefore be necessary [Leibniz] |
| 16986 | That there might have been unicorns is false; we don't know the circumstances for unicorns [Kripke] |
| 17590 | A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion [Inwagen] |
| 17591 | Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities [Inwagen] |
| 18925 | If talking donkeys are possible, something exists which could be a talking donkey [Williamson, by Cameron] |
| 15142 | Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson] |
| 13719 | Barcan Formula problem: there might have been a ghost, despite nothing existing which could be a ghost [Sider] |
| 19037 | Are there possible objects which nothing has ever had the potentiality to produce? [Vetter] |