more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 5057

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory ]

Full Idea

Every time we find some quality in a subject, we ought to think that, if we understood the nature of this subject and of this quality, we should conceive how this quality could result from it.

Gist of Idea

If you fully understand a subject and its qualities, you see how the second derive from the first

Source

Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], Pref)

Book Ref

Leibniz,Gottfried: 'Philosophical Writings', ed/tr. Parkinson,G.H.R. [Dent 1973], p.168


A Reaction

Thus (in Kripke's analogy) God cannot make 'subjects' on Thursday and then add 'qualities' on Friday. Add the point that all subjects are physical, and I say you have the whole story. The physical entails the mental. The laws result from the qualities.

Related Idea

Idea 13191 The properties of a thing flow from its essence [Leibniz]


The 21 ideas with the same theme [essence is what intrinsically explains a thing]:

Primary substances are ontological in 'Categories', and explanatory in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin]
Metaphysics is the science of ultimate explanation, or of pure existence, or of primary existence [Aristotle, by Politis]
The four explanations are the main aspects of a thing's nature [Aristotle, by Moravcsik]
A thing's nature is what causes its changes and stability [Aristotle]
Aristotelian essences are properties mentioned at the starting point of a science [Aristotle, by Kung]
All natures of things produce some effect [Spinoza]
Explanatory essence won't do, because it won't distinguish the accidental from the essential [Locke, by Pasnau]
If you fully understand a subject and its qualities, you see how the second derive from the first [Leibniz]
Essential properties are the 'deepest' ones which explain the others [Copi, by Rami]
Aristotelian essences underlie a thing's existence, explain it, and must belong to it [Kung]
Essentialism is justified if the essential properties of things explain their other properties [Brody]
Essences are not explanations, but individuations [Wiggins]
The essence of a star includes the released binding energy which keeps it from collapse [Inwagen]
Essences mainly explain the existence of unified substance [Witt]
Natural kinds don't need essentialism to be explanatory [Dupré]
An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami]
Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted [Lowe]
All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them [Lowe]
Essence is not explanatory but constitutive [Oderberg]
Being a deepest explanatory feature is an actual, not a modal property [Sidelle]
The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P]