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Single Idea 5077
[filed under theme 23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
]
Full Idea
In modern moral thinking, obligation is something every responsible person is supposed to have, but it is not an obligation to the state, or society, or humanity, or even to God. It is an obligation standing by itself.
Gist of Idea
The modern idea of obligation seems to have lost the idea of an obligation 'to' something
Source
Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.12)
Book Ref
Taylor,Richard: 'Virtue Ethics: an Introduction' [Prometheus 2002], p.83
A Reaction
This nicely pinpoints how some our moral attitudes are relics of religion. Taylor wants a return to virtue, but one could respond by opting for the social contract (with very clear obligations) or Kantian 'contractualism' (answering to rational beings).
The
24 ideas
with the same theme
[moral theories centring on the idea of duty]:
5252
|
'Enkrateia' (control) means abiding by one's own calculations
[Aristotle]
|
3549
|
Ariston says rules are useless for the virtuous and the non-virtuous
[Ariston, by Annas]
|
19407
|
We want good education and sociability, rather than lots of moral precepts
[Leibniz]
|
6257
|
You can't form moral rules without an end, which needs feelings and a moral sense
[Hutcheson]
|
7105
|
If 'maxims' are deeper underlying intentions, Kant can be read as a virtue theorist
[Kant, by Statman]
|
7625
|
We can ask how rational goodness is, but also why is rationality good
[Putnam on Kant]
|
4024
|
Kant follows Rousseau in defining freedom and morality in terms of each other
[Taylor,C on Kant]
|
3710
|
The only purely good thing is a good will
[Kant]
|
3715
|
Other causes can produce nice results, so morality must consist in the law, found only in rational beings
[Kant]
|
3737
|
The will is good if its universalised maxim is never in conflict with itself
[Kant]
|
20715
|
It is basic that moral actions must be done from duty
[Kant]
|
2915
|
Each person should devise his own virtues and categorical imperative
[Nietzsche]
|
7185
|
Replace the categorical imperative by the natural imperative
[Nietzsche]
|
8065
|
'Ought' and 'right' are survivals from earlier ethics, and should be jettisoned
[Anscombe]
|
8069
|
Between Aristotle and us, a Judaeo-Christian legal conception of ethics was developed
[Anscombe]
|
22391
|
Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system
[Foot]
|
5077
|
The modern idea of obligation seems to have lost the idea of an obligation 'to' something
[Taylor,R]
|
4113
|
'Deon' in Greek means what one must do; there was no word meaning 'duty'
[Williams,B]
|
3261
|
Something may be 'rational' either because it is required or because it is acceptable
[Nagel]
|
20276
|
Conflict of rules might be avoided by greater complexity, or by a hierarchy of rules
[Singer]
|
3784
|
Duty prohibits some acts, whatever their consequences
[Glover]
|
3550
|
Principles cover life as a whole, where rules just cover actions
[Annas]
|
4327
|
Deontologists do consider consequences, because they reveal when a rule might apply
[Hursthouse]
|
4335
|
'Codifiable' morality give rules for decisions which don't require wisdom
[Hursthouse]
|