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Single Idea 5163

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations ]

Full Idea

There is a class of empirical propositions, which I call 'basic propositions', which can be verified conclusively, since they refer solely to the contents of a single experience, which are incorrigible.

Clarification

'Incorrigible' means cannot be mistaken

Gist of Idea

Basic propositions refer to a single experience, are incorrigible, and conclusively verifiable

Source

A.J. Ayer (Introduction to 'Language Truth and Logic' [1946], p.13)

Book Ref

Ayer,A.J.: 'Language, Truth and Logic' [Penguin 1974], p.13


A Reaction

A classic statement of empirical foundationalism. I sort of agree that 'single experiences' are a 'given' for philosophy, but is questionable whether there is anything which could both be a single experience AND give rise to a proposition.


The 11 ideas with the same theme [experience is the foundation for knowledge]:

The only possible standard for settling doubts is the foundation of the senses [Lucretius]
Reasons for belief must eventually terminate in experience, or they are without foundation [Hume]
All knowledge (of things and of truths) rests on the foundations of acquaintance [Russell]
Basic propositions refer to a single experience, are incorrigible, and conclusively verifiable [Ayer]
If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars]
Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa]
Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa]
Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock]
Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M]
Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M]
Sense experiences must have conceptual content, since they are possible reasons for judgements [Brewer,B]