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Single Idea 5171
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
]
Full Idea
The problems of bridging the 'gulf' between mind and matter, in knowledge or in action, are all fictitious problems arising out of the senseless metaphysical conception of mind and matter as 'substances'.
Gist of Idea
The supposed 'gulf' between mind and matter is based on the senseless concept of 'substances'
Source
A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.7)
Book Ref
Ayer,A.J.: 'Language, Truth and Logic' [Penguin 1974], p.164
A Reaction
He is presumably implying that there is only one 'substance', the stuff of physics, thus voting for Spinoza's dual aspect theory. There could still be a 'gulf', between incommensurable properties, or untranslatable levels of description.
The
85 ideas
from A.J. Ayer
6973
|
Moral theories are all meta-ethical, and are neutral as regards actual conduct
[Ayer]
|
6968
|
Some people think there are ethical facts, but of a 'queer' sort
[Ayer]
|
6969
|
Approval of historical or fictional murders gives us leave to imitate them
[Ayer]
|
6970
|
Moral judgements are not expressions, but are elements in a behaviour pattern
[Ayer]
|
6971
|
I would describe intuitions of good as feelings of approval
[Ayer]
|
6972
|
A right attitude is just an attitude one is prepared to stand by
[Ayer]
|
6974
|
Moral judgements cannot be the logical consequence of a moral philosophy
[Ayer]
|
5322
|
Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership
[Ayer]
|
5325
|
Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject?
[Ayer]
|
5326
|
Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements
[Ayer]
|
5324
|
Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity
[Ayer]
|
5327
|
Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories
[Ayer]
|
5329
|
Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation!
[Ayer]
|
5328
|
Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds
[Ayer]
|
5330
|
Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events
[Ayer]
|
2613
|
The theory of other minds has no rival
[Ayer]
|
5331
|
You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does
[Ayer]
|
16520
|
We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual
[Ayer]
|
2611
|
It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence
[Ayer]
|
2610
|
Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences
[Ayer]
|
5661
|
We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences
[Ayer]
|
5662
|
Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable
[Ayer]
|
5664
|
Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects
[Ayer]
|
5668
|
People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body
[Ayer]
|
5666
|
Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress
[Ayer]
|
5665
|
Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences
[Ayer]
|
5669
|
Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them
[Ayer]
|
8824
|
No one has defended translational phenomenalism since Ayer in 1940
[Ayer, by Kim]
|
15251
|
The attribution of necessity to causation is either primitive animism, or confusion with logical necessity
[Ayer]
|
5162
|
Sentences only express propositions if they are meaningful; otherwise they are 'statements'
[Ayer]
|
5163
|
Basic propositions refer to a single experience, are incorrigible, and conclusively verifiable
[Ayer]
|
5164
|
A statement is meaningful if observation statements can be deduced from it
[Ayer]
|
5165
|
Directly verifiable statements must entail at least one new observation statement
[Ayer]
|
5166
|
The principle of verification is not an empirical hypothesis, but a definition
[Ayer]
|
5167
|
The argument from analogy fails, so the best account of other minds is behaviouristic
[Ayer]
|
5168
|
Moral approval and disapproval concerns classes of actions, rather than particular actions
[Ayer]
|
6524
|
Positivists prefer sense-data to objects, because the vocabulary covers both illusions and perceptions
[Ayer, by Robinson,H]
|
4729
|
Empiricism lacked a decent account of the a priori, until Ayer said it was entirely analytic
[O'Grady on Ayer]
|
6525
|
Logical positivists could never give the sense-data equivalent of 'there is a table next door'
[Robinson,H on Ayer]
|
6523
|
Positivists regard ontology as either meaningless or stipulated
[Ayer, by Robinson,H]
|
7919
|
Humeans rejected the a priori synthetic, and so rejected even Kantian metaphysics
[Ayer, by Macdonald,C]
|
5179
|
Philosophy deals with the questions that scientists do not wish to handle
[Ayer]
|
5183
|
Only tautologies can be certain; other propositions can only be probable
[Ayer]
|
5180
|
All propositions (especially 'metaphysics') must begin with the senses
[Ayer]
|
5185
|
It is further sense-experience which informs us of the mistakes that arise out of sense-experience
[Ayer]
|
5181
|
A sentence is factually significant to someone if they know how to verify its proposition
[Ayer]
|
5184
|
Factual propositions imply (in conjunction with a few other premises) possible experiences
[Ayer]
|
5186
|
Tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions
[Ayer]
|
5187
|
When we ascribe an attribute to a thing, we covertly assert that it exists
[Ayer]
|
5190
|
The induction problem is to prove generalisations about the future based on the past
[Ayer]
|
5191
|
We can't use the uniformity of nature to prove induction, as that would be circular
[Ayer]
|
5193
|
Causal and representative theories of perception are wrong as they refer to unobservables
[Ayer]
|
5198
|
We could verify 'a thing can't be in two places at once' by destroying one of the things
[Ierubino on Ayer]
|
5197
|
By changing definitions we could make 'a thing can't be in two places at once' a contradiction
[Ayer]
|
5195
|
Critics say analysis can only show the parts, and not their distinctive configuration
[Ayer]
|
5196
|
Philosophy is a department of logic
[Ayer]
|
5189
|
Philosophers should abandon speculation, as philosophy is wholly critical
[Ayer]
|
5202
|
Maths and logic are true universally because they are analytic or tautological
[Ayer]
|
5200
|
The main claim of rationalism is that thought is an independent source of knowledge
[Ayer]
|
2619
|
Whether geometry can be applied to reality is an empirical question outside of geometry
[Ayer]
|
5199
|
Empiricism, it is said, cannot account for our knowledge of necessary truths
[Ayer]
|
5204
|
To say that a proposition is true a priori is to say that it is a tautology
[Ayer]
|
4749
|
We cannot analyse the concept of 'truth', because it is simply a mark that a sentence is asserted
[Ayer]
|
5207
|
If theism is non-sensical, then so is atheism.
[Ayer]
|
5209
|
The 'truths' expressed by theists are not literally significant
[Ayer]
|
5208
|
A person with non-empirical attributes is unintelligible.
[Ayer]
|
5205
|
Moral intuition is worthless if there is no criterion to decide between intuitions
[Ayer]
|
23725
|
Ayer defends the emotivist version of expressivism
[Ayer, by Smith,M]
|
5206
|
To say an act is wrong makes no further statement about it, but merely expresses disapproval
[Ayer]
|
5172
|
If the self is meaningful, it must be constructed from sense-experiences
[Ayer]
|
5173
|
Two experiences belong to one self if their contents belong with one body
[Ayer]
|
5176
|
Empiricists can define personal identity as bodily identity, which consists of sense-contents
[Ayer]
|
5177
|
Other minds are 'metaphysical' objects, because I can never observe their experiences
[Ayer]
|
5178
|
A conscious object is by definition one that behaves in a certain way, so behaviour proves consciousness
[Ayer]
|
5171
|
The supposed 'gulf' between mind and matter is based on the senseless concept of 'substances'
[Ayer]
|
5169
|
My empiricism logically distinguishes analytic and synthetic propositions, and metaphysical verbiage
[Ayer]
|
5170
|
Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents
[Ayer]
|
2614
|
Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data
[Ayer]
|
2615
|
The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality
[Ayer]
|
19459
|
To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory
[Ayer]
|
19460
|
'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless
[Ayer]
|
19461
|
Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature
[Ayer]
|
19463
|
Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past
[Ayer]
|
19464
|
We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing
[Ayer]
|
19462
|
Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively
[Ayer]
|