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Single Idea 5177

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds ]

Full Idea

On the view that we are discussing, I must regard other people as metaphysical objects; for it is assumed that their experiences are completely inaccessible to my observation.

Gist of Idea

Other minds are 'metaphysical' objects, because I can never observe their experiences

Source

A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.7)

Book Ref

Ayer,A.J.: 'Language, Truth and Logic' [Penguin 1974], p.170


A Reaction

'Metaphysical' is here a dirty word. This is the strictly empirical view of other minds, which pushes Ayer towards behaviourism on this subject. He should have asked about the 'best explanation' of the behaviour of others'.


The 6 ideas with the same theme [doubts about knowledge of other minds]:

If we can't know minds, we can't know if Pyrrho was a sceptic [Theodosius, by Diog. Laertius]
A consciousness can conceive of no other consciousness than itself [Sartre]
We can never, even in principle, grasp other minds, because the Ego is self-conceiving [Sartre]
Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer]
Other minds are 'metaphysical' objects, because I can never observe their experiences [Ayer]
If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson]