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Single Idea 5185

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism ]

Full Idea

It is further sense-experience which informs us of the mistakes that arise out of sense-experience.

Gist of Idea

It is further sense-experience which informs us of the mistakes that arise out of sense-experience

Source

A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.1)

Book Ref

Ayer,A.J.: 'Language, Truth and Logic' [Penguin 1974], p.53

A Reaction

This is a wonderfull plain-spoken challenge to anyone who thinks they can demonstrate facts a priori about reality. 'I see this object in two places at once'? 'This object appears to be both red and green'?

The 41 ideas from 'Language,Truth and Logic'

7919 Humeans rejected the a priori synthetic, and so rejected even Kantian metaphysics [Ayer, by Macdonald,C]
6523 Positivists regard ontology as either meaningless or stipulated [Ayer, by Robinson,H]
6525 Logical positivists could never give the sense-data equivalent of 'there is a table next door' [Robinson,H on Ayer]
6524 Positivists prefer sense-data to objects, because the vocabulary covers both illusions and perceptions [Ayer, by Robinson,H]
4729 Empiricism lacked a decent account of the a priori, until Ayer said it was entirely analytic [O'Grady on Ayer]
5180 All propositions (especially 'metaphysics') must begin with the senses [Ayer]
5185 It is further sense-experience which informs us of the mistakes that arise out of sense-experience [Ayer]
5187 When we ascribe an attribute to a thing, we covertly assert that it exists [Ayer]
5183 Only tautologies can be certain; other propositions can only be probable [Ayer]
5179 Philosophy deals with the questions that scientists do not wish to handle [Ayer]
5181 A sentence is factually significant to someone if they know how to verify its proposition [Ayer]
5184 Factual propositions imply (in conjunction with a few other premises) possible experiences [Ayer]
5186 Tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions [Ayer]
5190 The induction problem is to prove generalisations about the future based on the past [Ayer]
5191 We can't use the uniformity of nature to prove induction, as that would be circular [Ayer]
5195 Critics say analysis can only show the parts, and not their distinctive configuration [Ayer]
5196 Philosophy is a department of logic [Ayer]
5189 Philosophers should abandon speculation, as philosophy is wholly critical [Ayer]
5193 Causal and representative theories of perception are wrong as they refer to unobservables [Ayer]
5197 By changing definitions we could make 'a thing can't be in two places at once' a contradiction [Ayer]
5198 We could verify 'a thing can't be in two places at once' by destroying one of the things [Ierubino on Ayer]
2619 Whether geometry can be applied to reality is an empirical question outside of geometry [Ayer]
5204 To say that a proposition is true a priori is to say that it is a tautology [Ayer]
5200 The main claim of rationalism is that thought is an independent source of knowledge [Ayer]
5202 Maths and logic are true universally because they are analytic or tautological [Ayer]
5199 Empiricism, it is said, cannot account for our knowledge of necessary truths [Ayer]
4749 We cannot analyse the concept of 'truth', because it is simply a mark that a sentence is asserted [Ayer]
5205 Moral intuition is worthless if there is no criterion to decide between intuitions [Ayer]
23725 Ayer defends the emotivist version of expressivism [Ayer, by Smith,M]
5206 To say an act is wrong makes no further statement about it, but merely expresses disapproval [Ayer]
5207 If theism is non-sensical, then so is atheism. [Ayer]
5208 A person with non-empirical attributes is unintelligible. [Ayer]
5209 The 'truths' expressed by theists are not literally significant [Ayer]
5169 My empiricism logically distinguishes analytic and synthetic propositions, and metaphysical verbiage [Ayer]
5177 Other minds are 'metaphysical' objects, because I can never observe their experiences [Ayer]
5178 A conscious object is by definition one that behaves in a certain way, so behaviour proves consciousness [Ayer]
5172 If the self is meaningful, it must be constructed from sense-experiences [Ayer]
5173 Two experiences belong to one self if their contents belong with one body [Ayer]
5176 Empiricists can define personal identity as bodily identity, which consists of sense-contents [Ayer]
5171 The supposed 'gulf' between mind and matter is based on the senseless concept of 'substances' [Ayer]
5170 Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents [Ayer]