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Single Idea 5192
[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
]
Full Idea
Berkeley did not (as we are commonly told) deny the reality of material things. ..What Berkeley discovered was that material things must be defined in terms of sense-contents.
Gist of Idea
Berkeley did not deny material things; he merely said they must be defined through sensations
Source
report of George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713]) by A.J. Ayer - Language,Truth and Logic Ch.2
Book Ref
Ayer,A.J.: 'Language, Truth and Logic' [Penguin 1974], p.70
A Reaction
This seems to be a rather debatable attempt to claim that Berkeley was a phenomenalist (like Ayer), rather than an idealist. Try ideas 3942, 3944, 3945, 3957, 3959 in this database.
Related Ideas
Idea 3942
I do not believe in the existence of anything, if I see no reason to believe it [Berkeley]
Idea 3944
It is possible that we could perceive everything as we do now, but nothing actually existed. [Berkeley]
Idea 3945
There is nothing in nature which needs the concept of matter to explain it [Berkeley]
Idea 3957
Immediate objects of perception, which some treat as appearances, I treat as the real things themselves [Berkeley]
Idea 3959
There is no other substance, in a strict sense, than spirit [Berkeley]
The
31 ideas
with the same theme
[reality is just actual and potential appearances]:
1549
|
Everything that exists consists in being perceived
[Protagoras]
|
2261
|
My perceiving of things may be false, but my seeming to perceive them cannot be false
[Descartes]
|
12739
|
If we are dreaming, it is sufficient that the events are coherent, and obey laws
[Leibniz]
|
5192
|
Berkeley did not deny material things; he merely said they must be defined through sensations
[Berkeley, by Ayer]
|
5174
|
Berkeley needed a phenomenalist account of the self, as well as of material things
[Ayer on Berkeley]
|
3931
|
Sensible objects are just sets of sensible qualities
[Berkeley]
|
6722
|
Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit
[Berkeley]
|
5601
|
There are possible inhabitants of the moon, but they are just possible experiences
[Kant]
|
3583
|
External objects are permanent possibilities of sensation
[Mill]
|
18988
|
Behind the bare phenomenal facts there is nothing
[Wright,Ch]
|
23207
|
Appearance is the sole reality of things, to which all predicates refer
[Nietzsche]
|
6418
|
Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations
[Russell, by Grayling]
|
6466
|
Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities
[Russell]
|
4153
|
Are sense-data the material of which the universe is made?
[Wittgenstein]
|
20743
|
Appearances do not hide the essence; appearances are the essence
[Sartre]
|
8824
|
No one has defended translational phenomenalism since Ayer in 1940
[Ayer, by Kim]
|
6525
|
Logical positivists could never give the sense-data equivalent of 'there is a table next door'
[Robinson,H on Ayer]
|
5170
|
Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents
[Ayer]
|
2614
|
Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data
[Ayer]
|
18209
|
We can never translate our whole language of objects into phenomenalism
[Quine]
|
8199
|
The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy
[Dummett]
|
2778
|
Phenomenalism includes possible experiences, but idealism only refers to actual experiences
[Dancy,J]
|
3592
|
Phenomenalism is a form of idealism
[Williams,M]
|
2721
|
If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end?
[Audi,R]
|
2722
|
Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism
[Audi,R]
|
6522
|
Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century)
[Robinson,H]
|
6359
|
Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
7301
|
The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable
[Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
|
7302
|
Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects
[Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
|
7303
|
If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'?
[Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
|
20963
|
A philosopher and his wife are out for a drive...
[Sommers,W]
|