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Full Idea
The fact that all causal and representative theories of perception treat material things as if they were unobservable entities entitles us to rule them out a priori.
Gist of Idea
Causal and representative theories of perception are wrong as they refer to unobservables
Source
A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.2)
Book Ref
Ayer,A.J.: 'Language, Truth and Logic' [Penguin 1974], p.71
A Reaction
It seems to me that we can accept a causal/representative account of perception if we think of it in terms of 'best explanation' rather than observables. Explanation requires speculation, which logical positivists can't cope with.
| 5927 | I prefer the causal theory to sense data, because sensations are events, not apprehensions [Ross] |
| 5193 | Causal and representative theories of perception are wrong as they refer to unobservables [Ayer] |
| 3900 | Maybe experience is not essential to perception, but only to the causing of beliefs [Armstrong, by Scruton] |
| 2784 | Appearances don't guarantee reality, unless the appearance is actually caused by the reality [Dancy,J] |
| 2785 | Perceptual beliefs may be directly caused, but generalisations can't be [Dancy,J] |
| 7871 | Perceptual concepts can't just refer to what causes classification [Papineau] |
| 7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
| 6640 | A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external [Lowe] |
| 6645 | If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong [Lowe] |
| 3757 | Causal theory says true perceptions must be caused by the object perceived [Bernecker/Dretske] |