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Full Idea
The proposition that 'a material thing cannot be in two places at once' is not empirical at all, but linguistic; ..we could so alter our definitions that the proposition came to express a self-contradiction instead of a necessary truth.
Gist of Idea
By changing definitions we could make 'a thing can't be in two places at once' a contradiction
Source
A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.2)
Book Ref
Ayer,A.J.: 'Language, Truth and Logic' [Penguin 1974], p.77
A Reaction
This seems a striking anticipation of Quine's famous challenge to the analytic/synthetic distinction.
| 5403 | If, as Kant says, arithmetic and logic are contributed by us, they could change if we did [Russell on Kant] |
| 4539 | The forms of 'knowledge' about logic which precede experience are actually regulations of belief [Nietzsche] |
| 9365 | We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI] |
| 5197 | By changing definitions we could make 'a thing can't be in two places at once' a contradiction [Ayer] |
| 9005 | Examination of convention in the a priori begins to blur the distinction with empirical knowledge [Quine] |
| 9164 | We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H] |