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Single Idea 5199
[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
]
Full Idea
The objection which is commonly brought against empiricism is that it is impossible on empiricist principles to account for our knowledge of necessary truths.
Gist of Idea
Empiricism, it is said, cannot account for our knowledge of necessary truths
Source
A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.4)
Book Ref
Ayer,A.J.: 'Language, Truth and Logic' [Penguin 1974], p.96
A Reaction
This criticism goes back at least to Leibniz. Ayer's distinctive contribution to empiricism (with help) is to emphasise that we can only know necessities if they are tautologies. Hume always challenged our knowledge of natural necessities.
The
41 ideas
from 'Language,Truth and Logic'
7919
|
Humeans rejected the a priori synthetic, and so rejected even Kantian metaphysics
[Ayer, by Macdonald,C]
|
6523
|
Positivists regard ontology as either meaningless or stipulated
[Ayer, by Robinson,H]
|
6525
|
Logical positivists could never give the sense-data equivalent of 'there is a table next door'
[Robinson,H on Ayer]
|
6524
|
Positivists prefer sense-data to objects, because the vocabulary covers both illusions and perceptions
[Ayer, by Robinson,H]
|
4729
|
Empiricism lacked a decent account of the a priori, until Ayer said it was entirely analytic
[O'Grady on Ayer]
|
5180
|
All propositions (especially 'metaphysics') must begin with the senses
[Ayer]
|
5181
|
A sentence is factually significant to someone if they know how to verify its proposition
[Ayer]
|
5184
|
Factual propositions imply (in conjunction with a few other premises) possible experiences
[Ayer]
|
5186
|
Tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions
[Ayer]
|
5183
|
Only tautologies can be certain; other propositions can only be probable
[Ayer]
|
5179
|
Philosophy deals with the questions that scientists do not wish to handle
[Ayer]
|
5185
|
It is further sense-experience which informs us of the mistakes that arise out of sense-experience
[Ayer]
|
5187
|
When we ascribe an attribute to a thing, we covertly assert that it exists
[Ayer]
|
5195
|
Critics say analysis can only show the parts, and not their distinctive configuration
[Ayer]
|
5196
|
Philosophy is a department of logic
[Ayer]
|
5189
|
Philosophers should abandon speculation, as philosophy is wholly critical
[Ayer]
|
5198
|
We could verify 'a thing can't be in two places at once' by destroying one of the things
[Ierubino on Ayer]
|
5197
|
By changing definitions we could make 'a thing can't be in two places at once' a contradiction
[Ayer]
|
5193
|
Causal and representative theories of perception are wrong as they refer to unobservables
[Ayer]
|
5191
|
We can't use the uniformity of nature to prove induction, as that would be circular
[Ayer]
|
5190
|
The induction problem is to prove generalisations about the future based on the past
[Ayer]
|
5204
|
To say that a proposition is true a priori is to say that it is a tautology
[Ayer]
|
2619
|
Whether geometry can be applied to reality is an empirical question outside of geometry
[Ayer]
|
5202
|
Maths and logic are true universally because they are analytic or tautological
[Ayer]
|
5200
|
The main claim of rationalism is that thought is an independent source of knowledge
[Ayer]
|
5199
|
Empiricism, it is said, cannot account for our knowledge of necessary truths
[Ayer]
|
4749
|
We cannot analyse the concept of 'truth', because it is simply a mark that a sentence is asserted
[Ayer]
|
5205
|
Moral intuition is worthless if there is no criterion to decide between intuitions
[Ayer]
|
23725
|
Ayer defends the emotivist version of expressivism
[Ayer, by Smith,M]
|
5206
|
To say an act is wrong makes no further statement about it, but merely expresses disapproval
[Ayer]
|
5208
|
A person with non-empirical attributes is unintelligible.
[Ayer]
|
5207
|
If theism is non-sensical, then so is atheism.
[Ayer]
|
5209
|
The 'truths' expressed by theists are not literally significant
[Ayer]
|
5172
|
If the self is meaningful, it must be constructed from sense-experiences
[Ayer]
|
5173
|
Two experiences belong to one self if their contents belong with one body
[Ayer]
|
5176
|
Empiricists can define personal identity as bodily identity, which consists of sense-contents
[Ayer]
|
5171
|
The supposed 'gulf' between mind and matter is based on the senseless concept of 'substances'
[Ayer]
|
5177
|
Other minds are 'metaphysical' objects, because I can never observe their experiences
[Ayer]
|
5178
|
A conscious object is by definition one that behaves in a certain way, so behaviour proves consciousness
[Ayer]
|
5169
|
My empiricism logically distinguishes analytic and synthetic propositions, and metaphysical verbiage
[Ayer]
|
5170
|
Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents
[Ayer]
|