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Single Idea 5208
[filed under theme 28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
]
Full Idea
The notion of a person whose essential attributes are non-empirical is not an intelligible notion at all.
Gist of Idea
A person with non-empirical attributes is unintelligible.
Source
A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.6)
Book Ref
Ayer,A.J.: 'Language, Truth and Logic' [Penguin 1974], p.154
A Reaction
Non-empirical and non-causal are not quite the same thing. A being which never had any effects is a bizarre, and probably pointless, fantasy. A being which affected our world (through ideas, say) but is unobservable is a perfectly good theory.
The
41 ideas
from 'Language,Truth and Logic'
7919
|
Humeans rejected the a priori synthetic, and so rejected even Kantian metaphysics
[Ayer, by Macdonald,C]
|
6523
|
Positivists regard ontology as either meaningless or stipulated
[Ayer, by Robinson,H]
|
6525
|
Logical positivists could never give the sense-data equivalent of 'there is a table next door'
[Robinson,H on Ayer]
|
6524
|
Positivists prefer sense-data to objects, because the vocabulary covers both illusions and perceptions
[Ayer, by Robinson,H]
|
4729
|
Empiricism lacked a decent account of the a priori, until Ayer said it was entirely analytic
[O'Grady on Ayer]
|
5180
|
All propositions (especially 'metaphysics') must begin with the senses
[Ayer]
|
5181
|
A sentence is factually significant to someone if they know how to verify its proposition
[Ayer]
|
5184
|
Factual propositions imply (in conjunction with a few other premises) possible experiences
[Ayer]
|
5186
|
Tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions
[Ayer]
|
5183
|
Only tautologies can be certain; other propositions can only be probable
[Ayer]
|
5179
|
Philosophy deals with the questions that scientists do not wish to handle
[Ayer]
|
5185
|
It is further sense-experience which informs us of the mistakes that arise out of sense-experience
[Ayer]
|
5187
|
When we ascribe an attribute to a thing, we covertly assert that it exists
[Ayer]
|
5195
|
Critics say analysis can only show the parts, and not their distinctive configuration
[Ayer]
|
5196
|
Philosophy is a department of logic
[Ayer]
|
5189
|
Philosophers should abandon speculation, as philosophy is wholly critical
[Ayer]
|
5198
|
We could verify 'a thing can't be in two places at once' by destroying one of the things
[Ierubino on Ayer]
|
5197
|
By changing definitions we could make 'a thing can't be in two places at once' a contradiction
[Ayer]
|
5193
|
Causal and representative theories of perception are wrong as they refer to unobservables
[Ayer]
|
5191
|
We can't use the uniformity of nature to prove induction, as that would be circular
[Ayer]
|
5190
|
The induction problem is to prove generalisations about the future based on the past
[Ayer]
|
5204
|
To say that a proposition is true a priori is to say that it is a tautology
[Ayer]
|
2619
|
Whether geometry can be applied to reality is an empirical question outside of geometry
[Ayer]
|
5202
|
Maths and logic are true universally because they are analytic or tautological
[Ayer]
|
5200
|
The main claim of rationalism is that thought is an independent source of knowledge
[Ayer]
|
5199
|
Empiricism, it is said, cannot account for our knowledge of necessary truths
[Ayer]
|
4749
|
We cannot analyse the concept of 'truth', because it is simply a mark that a sentence is asserted
[Ayer]
|
5205
|
Moral intuition is worthless if there is no criterion to decide between intuitions
[Ayer]
|
23725
|
Ayer defends the emotivist version of expressivism
[Ayer, by Smith,M]
|
5206
|
To say an act is wrong makes no further statement about it, but merely expresses disapproval
[Ayer]
|
5208
|
A person with non-empirical attributes is unintelligible.
[Ayer]
|
5207
|
If theism is non-sensical, then so is atheism.
[Ayer]
|
5209
|
The 'truths' expressed by theists are not literally significant
[Ayer]
|
5172
|
If the self is meaningful, it must be constructed from sense-experiences
[Ayer]
|
5173
|
Two experiences belong to one self if their contents belong with one body
[Ayer]
|
5176
|
Empiricists can define personal identity as bodily identity, which consists of sense-contents
[Ayer]
|
5171
|
The supposed 'gulf' between mind and matter is based on the senseless concept of 'substances'
[Ayer]
|
5177
|
Other minds are 'metaphysical' objects, because I can never observe their experiences
[Ayer]
|
5178
|
A conscious object is by definition one that behaves in a certain way, so behaviour proves consciousness
[Ayer]
|
5169
|
My empiricism logically distinguishes analytic and synthetic propositions, and metaphysical verbiage
[Ayer]
|
5170
|
Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents
[Ayer]
|