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Full Idea
In cases where the movement of the limbs that are the instruments of action has its origin in the agent himself, it is in his power either to act or not, and therefore such actions are voluntary.
Gist of Idea
An action is voluntary if the limb movements originate in the agent
Source
Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1110a15)
Book Ref
Aristotle: 'Ethics (Nicomachean)', ed/tr. ThomsonJ A K/TredennickH [Penguin 1976], p.111
A Reaction
He asserts this to show that an action is voluntary even under extreme compulsion or pressure. This seems right, and moves the focus to the concept of an 'excuse', which covers forgivable voluntary actions.
| 5211 | An action is voluntary if the limb movements originate in the agent [Aristotle] |
| 5221 | Deliberation ends when the starting-point of an action is traced back to the dominant part of the self [Aristotle] |
| 20051 | Reid said that agent causation is a unique type of causation [Reid, by Stout,R] |
| 20054 | There has to be a brain event which is not caused by another event, but by the agent [Chisholm] |
| 20015 | Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 5488 | Regularity theories of causation cannot give an account of human agency [Ellis] |
| 20052 | If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R] |
| 20050 | Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R] |