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Single Idea 5237

[filed under theme 23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism ]

Full Idea

It is not easy to define by rule how, and how far, a person may go wrong before he incurs blame; because this depends upon particular circumstances, and the decision lies with our perception.

Gist of Idea

We cannot properly judge by rules, because blame depends on perception of particulars

Source

Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1126b04)

Book Ref

Aristotle: 'Ethics (Nicomachean)', ed/tr. ThomsonJ A K/TredennickH [Penguin 1976], p.162


A Reaction

This is a key objection to Kantian approaches to morality. Aristotle does not flatly deny the role of rules (indeed, he is a great endorser of the law), but this shows why virtues of character are a better guide than rules can ever be.


The 18 ideas with the same theme [there are no rules, so we must attend to details]:

It is not universals we must perceive for virtue, but particulars, seen as intrinsically good [Aristotle, by Achtenberg]
Actions concern particular cases, and rules must fit the cases, not the other way round [Aristotle]
We cannot properly judge by rules, because blame depends on perception of particulars [Aristotle]
All human ills result from failure to apply preconceptions to particular cases [Epictetus]
Moralities extravagantly address themselves to 'all', by falsely generalising [Nietzsche]
Actual morality is more complicated and subtle than theory (which gets paralysed) [Nietzsche]
No two actions are the same [Nietzsche]
Moral generalisation is wrong, because we should evaluate individual acts [Nietzsche, by Foot]
I see the need to pay a debt in a particular instance, and any instance will do [Prichard]
The complexities of life make it almost impossible to assess morality from a universal viewpoint [Prichard]
The mistake is to think we can prove what can only be seen directly in moral thinking [Prichard]
Prima facie duties rest self-evidently on particular circumstance [Ross]
The ground for an attitude is not a thing's 'goodness', but its concrete characteristics [Ewing]
If I attend properly I will have no choices [Murdoch]
Particularism gives no guidance for the future [Nussbaum]
Maybe the particularist moral thought of women is better than the impartial public thinking of men [Kymlicka]
Virtue theory can have lots of rules, as long as they are grounded in virtues and in facts [Zagzebski]
Any strict ranking of virtues or rules gets abandoned when faced with particular cases [Hursthouse]