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Single Idea 5268

[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health ]

Full Idea

One may argue that disreputable pleasures are not pleasant; they may be pleasant to persons of unhealthy disposition, just as things may seem sweet or bitter or white to persons with unhealthy taste or vision.

Gist of Idea

Disreputable pleasures are only pleasant to persons with diseased perception

Source

Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1173b20)

Book Ref

Aristotle: 'Ethics (Nicomachean)', ed/tr. ThomsonJ A K/TredennickH [Penguin 1976], p.317


A Reaction

Aristotle's analogy gives quite good support for what seems a rather implausible view. Bentham disagrees. It certainly seems odd to deny that a sadist is obtaining pleasure. Surely that is what we object to? Is pleasure a value?


The 11 ideas with the same theme [successful functioning of an organ or creature]:

Pythagoras taught that virtue is harmony, and health, and universal good, and God [Pythagoras, by Diog. Laertius]
Wisdom creates a healthy passion-free soul [Democritus]
Goodness is mental health, badness is mental sickness [Plato]
Excess and deficiency are bad for virtue, just as they are for bodily health [Aristotle]
Disreputable pleasures are only pleasant to persons with diseased perception [Aristotle]
Everything seeks, not a single good, but its own separate good [Aristotle]
Good breeding in men means having a good character [Democritus (attr)]
Stoics said health is an 'indifferent', but they still considered it preferable [Stoic school, by Pormann]
The health of the soul is a good blend of beliefs [Stoic school, by Stobaeus]
Humans acquired the concept of virtue from an analogy with bodily health and strength [Seneca, by Allen]
The Greeks had a single word meaning both 'beautiful' and 'good' [Pormann]