more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
The ground for thinking that qualia are only experiences because they relate to a unifying subject is that they have to be identified, by being brought under concepts, and giving rise to judgements which usually go beyond them.
Clarification
'Qualia' are raw unprocessed experiences
Gist of Idea
Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements
Source
A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.B)
Book Ref
Ayer,A.J.: 'The Central Questions of Philosophy' [Penguin 1976], p.118
A Reaction
Thus one of Hume's greatest fans gives the clearest objection to Hume. It strikes me as a very powerful objection, better than anything Carruthers offers (1394,1395,1396). The conceptual element is very hard to disentangle from the qualia.
Related Ideas
Idea 1394 Can the mental elements of a 'bundle' exist on their own? [Carruthers]
Idea 1395 Why would a thought be a member of one bundle rather than another? [Carruthers]
Idea 1396 We identify persons before identifying conscious states [Carruthers]
3819 | Hume's 'bundle' won't distinguish one mind with ten experiences from ten minds [Searle on Hume] |
1317 | A person is just a fast-moving bundle of perceptions [Hume] |
1331 | The parts of a person are always linked together by causation [Hume] |
1388 | Hume gives us an interesting sketchy causal theory of personal identity [Perry on Hume] |
21297 | A person is simply a bundle of continually fluctuating perceptions [Hume] |
5323 | Experiences are logically separate, but factually linked by simultaneity or a feeling of continuousness [Ayer on Hume] |
5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
5172 | If the self is meaningful, it must be constructed from sense-experiences [Ayer] |
3820 | The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle] |
3539 | Personal identity is just causally related mental states [Parfit, by Maslin] |
1394 | Can the mental elements of a 'bundle' exist on their own? [Carruthers] |
1395 | Why would a thought be a member of one bundle rather than another? [Carruthers] |