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Full Idea
The ground for thinking that qualia are only experiences because they relate to a unifying subject is that they have to be identified, by being brought under concepts, and giving rise to judgements which usually go beyond them.
Clarification
'Qualia' are raw unprocessed experiences
Gist of Idea
Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements
Source
A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.B)
Book Ref
Ayer,A.J.: 'The Central Questions of Philosophy' [Penguin 1976], p.118
A Reaction
Thus one of Hume's greatest fans gives the clearest objection to Hume. It strikes me as a very powerful objection, better than anything Carruthers offers (1394,1395,1396). The conceptual element is very hard to disentangle from the qualia.
Related Ideas
Idea 1394 Can the mental elements of a 'bundle' exist on their own? [Carruthers]
Idea 1395 Why would a thought be a member of one bundle rather than another? [Carruthers]
Idea 1396 We identify persons before identifying conscious states [Carruthers]
| 5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
| 5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
| 5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
| 5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
| 5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
| 5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
| 5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
| 5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
| 5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
| 2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
| 16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
| 2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
| 2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |