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Single Idea 5328

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds ]

Full Idea

In 1936 I combined a mentalistic analysis of the propositions in which one attributes experiences to oneself with a behaviouristic analysis of the propositions in which one attributes experiences to others.

Clarification

'Mentalistic' views refer to pure consciousness

Gist of Idea

Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds

Source

A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.D)

Book Ref

Ayer,A.J.: 'The Central Questions of Philosophy' [Penguin 1976], p.126


A Reaction

He then criticises his view for inconsistency. Ryle preferred a behaviouristic account of introspection, but Ayer calls this 'ridiculous'. Ayer hunts for a compromise, but then settles for the right answer, which makes mentalism the 'best explanation'.


The 22 ideas with the same theme [how we might know of other minds]:

We discovers others as well as ourselves in the Cogito [Sartre on Descartes]
We are satisfied that other men have minds, from their words and actions [Locke]
Experience tells me that other minds exist independently from my own [Berkeley]
I know other minds by ideas which are referred by me to other agents, as their effects [Berkeley]
Husserl's monads (egos) communicate, through acts of empathy. [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
We know another's mind via bodily expression, while also knowing it is inaccessible [Husserl, by Bernet]
Other minds seem to exist, because their testimony supports realism about the world [Russell, by Grayling]
It is hard not to believe that speaking humans are expressing thoughts, just as we do ourselves [Russell]
Dasein finds itself already amongst others [Heidegger, by Caputo]
If we work and play with other people, they are bound to be 'Dasein', intelligent agents [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE]
I don't have the opinion that people have minds; I just treat them as such [Wittgenstein]
Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer]
Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer]
The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer]
The argument from analogy fails, so the best account of other minds is behaviouristic [Ayer]
A conscious object is by definition one that behaves in a certain way, so behaviour proves consciousness [Ayer]
Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett]
We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds [Searle]
Young children can see that other individuals sometimes have false beliefs [Papineau]
Do we understand other minds by simulation-theory, or by theory-theory? [Papineau]
We know other's emotions by explanation, contagion, empathy, imagination, or sympathy [Goldie]
Empathy and imagining don't ensure sympathy, and sympathy doesn't need them [Goldie]