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Single Idea 5371

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations ]

Full Idea

We can know the properties of the relations required to preserve the correspondence between sense-data and reality, but we cannot know the nature of the terms between which the relations hold.

Gist of Idea

Because we depend on correspondence, we know relations better than we know the items that relate

Source

Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 3)

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'The Problems of Philosophy' [OUP 1995], p.16


A Reaction

Thus Russell always puts great emphasis on relations in his metaphysics. I would say that he is right, and that what he calls the 'nature of the terms' are essences, and that these are knowable, by inference and explanation.


The 35 ideas with the same theme [what we should understand a relation to be]:

Aristotle said relations are not substances, so (if they exist) they must be accidents [Aristotle, by Heil]
The separation from here to there is not the same as the separation from there to here [Aristotle]
The only reality in the category of Relation is things from another category [Henry of Ghent]
Relations do not add anything to reality, though they are real aspects of the world [Olivi]
The single imagined 'interval' between things only exists in the intellect [Auriol]
Relations are expressed either as absolute facts, or by a relational concept [William of Ockham]
The ratio between two lines can't be a feature of one, and cannot be in both [Leibniz]
A man's distant wife dying is a real change in him [Leibniz]
If relations can be reduced to, or supervene on, monadic properties of relata, they are not real [Leibniz, by Swoyer]
Relations aren't in any monad, so they are distributed, so they are not real [Leibniz]
Peirce and others began the mapping out of relations [Peirce, by Hart,WD]
With asymmetrical relations (before/after) the reduction to properties is impossible [Russell]
The only thing we can say about relations is that they relate [Russell]
Relational propositions seem to be 'about' their terms, rather than about the relation [Russell]
Philosophers of logic and maths insisted that a vocabulary of relations was essential [Russell, by Heil]
Because we depend on correspondence, we know relations better than we know the items that relate [Russell]
That Edinburgh is north of London is a non-mental fact, so relations are independent universals [Russell]
There is no complexity without relations, so no propositions, and no truth [Russell]
The 'positionalist' view of relations says the number of places is fixed, but not the order [Fine,K]
The 'standard' view of relations is that they hold of several objects in a given order [Fine,K]
A block on top of another contains one relation, not both 'on top of' and 'beneath' [Fine,K]
Language imposes a direction on a road which is not really part of the road [Fine,K]
Explain biased relations as orderings of the unbiased, or the unbiased as permutation classes of the biased? [Fine,K]
We want the ontology of relations, not just a formal way of specifying them [Heil]
Two people are indirectly related by height; the direct relation is internal, between properties [Heil]
Maybe all the other features of the world can be reduced to relations [Heil]
Most philosophers now (absurdly) believe that relations fully exist [Heil]
Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
A relation is a feature of multiple objects taken together [Sider]
It may be that internal relations like proportion exist, because we directly perceive it [MacBride]
It is a necessary condition for the existence of relations that both of the relata exist [Bourne]
All relations between spatio-temporal objects are either spatio-temporal, or causal [Bourne]
Relations without relata must be treated as universals, with their own formal properties [Ladyman/Ross]
A belief in relations must be a belief in things that are related [Ladyman/Ross]
Neo-Humeans say there are no substantial connections between anything [Ingthorsson]