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Single Idea 5374

[filed under theme 18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas ]

Full Idea

Berkeley seems to have confused the colour of the thing apprehended with the act of apprehension; probably either of these would have been called an 'idea' be Berkeley.

Gist of Idea

Berkeley probably used 'idea' to mean both the act of apprehension and the thing apprehended

Source

comment on George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713]) by Bertrand Russell - Problems of Philosophy

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'The Problems of Philosophy' [OUP 1995], p.22


A Reaction

If we are saying that Berkeley's error was entirely verbal, there is a chicken-and-egg problem. He was an idealist, so he wouldn't have thought that there were two separate concepts behind the word 'idea'. Russell merely asserts that there are.


The 18 ideas with the same theme [mental events which internally represent reality]:

True ideas are images, such as of a man, a chimera, or God [Descartes]
Ideas are powerful entities, which can produce further ideas [Spinoza, by Schmid]
An 'idea' is a mental conception which is actively formed by the mind in thinking [Spinoza]
Ideas are not images formed in the brain, but are the conceptions of thought [Spinoza]
An idea involves affirmation or negation [Spinoza]
Ideas are the objects of understanding when we think [Locke]
The word 'idea' covers thinking best, for imaginings, concepts, and basic experiences [Locke]
Complex ideas are all resolvable into simple ideas [Locke]
Thoughts correspond to sensations, but ideas are independent of thoughts [Leibniz]
An idea is an independent inner object, which expresses the qualities of things [Leibniz]
The idea of green seems simple, but it must be compounded of the ideas of blue and yellow [Leibniz]
We must distinguish images from exact defined ideas [Leibniz]
True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz]
By an 'idea' I mean not an actual thought, but the resources we can draw on to think [Leibniz]
Berkeley probably used 'idea' to mean both the act of apprehension and the thing apprehended [Russell on Berkeley]
Only philosophers treat ideas as objects [Reid]
Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor]
Cartesian 'ideas' confuse concepts and propositions [Scruton]