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Single Idea 5374

[filed under theme 18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas ]

Full Idea

Berkeley seems to have confused the colour of the thing apprehended with the act of apprehension; probably either of these would have been called an 'idea' be Berkeley.

Gist of Idea

Berkeley probably used 'idea' to mean both the act of apprehension and the thing apprehended

Source

comment on George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713]) by Bertrand Russell - Problems of Philosophy

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'The Problems of Philosophy' [OUP 1995], p.22

A Reaction

If we are saying that Berkeley's error was entirely verbal, there is a chicken-and-egg problem. He was an idealist, so he wouldn't have thought that there were two separate concepts behind the word 'idea'. Russell merely asserts that there are.

The 35 ideas from 'Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous'

5192 Berkeley did not deny material things; he merely said they must be defined through sensations [Berkeley, by Ayer]
5174 Berkeley needed a phenomenalist account of the self, as well as of material things [Ayer on Berkeley]
1103 'To be is to be perceived' is a simple confusion of experience with its objects [Russell on Berkeley]
6403 For Berkelely, reality is ideas and a community of minds, including God's [Berkeley, by Grayling]
5374 Berkeley probably used 'idea' to mean both the act of apprehension and the thing apprehended [Russell on Berkeley]
3930 There is no such thing as 'material substance' [Berkeley]
3931 Sensible objects are just sets of sensible qualities [Berkeley]
3932 A hot hand and a cold hand will have different experiences in the same tepid water [Berkeley]
3933 Primary qualities (such as shape, solidity, mass) are held to really exist, unlike secondary qualities [Berkeley]
3934 A mite would see its own foot as large, though we would see it as tiny [Berkeley]
3935 The apparent size of an object varies with its distance away, so that can't be a property of the object [Berkeley]
3936 Time is measured by the succession of ideas in our minds [Berkeley]
3937 'Solidity' is either not a sensible quality at all, or it is clearly relative to our senses [Berkeley]
3938 Geometry is originally perceived by senses, and so is not purely intellectual [Berkeley]
3939 I conceive a tree in my mind, but I cannot prove that its existence can be conceived outside a mind [Berkeley]
3940 Distance is not directly perceived by sight [Berkeley]
3950 There must be a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by him [Berkeley]
3949 It has been proved that creation is the workmanship of God, from its beauty and usefulness [Berkeley]
3941 How can that which is unthinking be a cause of thought? [Berkeley]
3942 I do not believe in the existence of anything, if I see no reason to believe it [Berkeley]
3943 If existence is perceived directly, by which sense; if indirectly, how is it inferred from direct perception? [Berkeley]
3944 It is possible that we could perceive everything as we do now, but nothing actually existed. [Berkeley]
3945 There is nothing in nature which needs the concept of matter to explain it [Berkeley]
3946 A thing is shown to be impossible if a contradiction is demonstrated within its definition [Berkeley]
3947 Perceptions are ideas, and ideas exist in the mind, so objects only exist in the mind [Berkeley]
3948 Experience tells me that other minds exist independently from my own [Berkeley]
3951 There must be a God, because I and my ideas are not independent [Berkeley]
3952 I know that nothing inconsistent can exist [Berkeley]
3953 Real things and imaginary or dreamed things differ because the latter are much fainter [Berkeley]
3954 Immorality is not in the action, but in the deviation of the will from moral law [Berkeley]
3955 If sin is not just physical, we don't consider God the origin of sin because he causes physical events [Berkeley]
3956 People are responsible because they have limited power, though this ultimately derives from God [Berkeley]
3957 Immediate objects of perception, which some treat as appearances, I treat as the real things themselves [Berkeley]
3958 Since our ideas vary when the real things are said to be unchanged, they cannot be true copies [Berkeley]
3959 There is no other substance, in a strict sense, than spirit [Berkeley]