more from this thinker
|
more from this text
Single Idea 5377
[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
]
Full Idea
We shall say we have 'acquaintance' with anything of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths.
Gist of Idea
'Acquaintance' is direct awareness, without inferences or judgements
Source
Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5)
Book Ref
Russell,Bertrand: 'The Problems of Philosophy' [OUP 1995], p.25
A Reaction
Although Russell understands the difficulty of precise distinctions here, he implies that some knowledge is directly knowable, although truth only enters at the stage of judgement. Personally I would suggest that pure acquaintance is not knowledge.
The
16 ideas
with the same theme
[we are in direct contact with reality]:
|
21337
|
A knowing being possesses a further reality, the 'presence' of the thing known
[Aquinas]
|
|
22130
|
Scotus defended direct 'intuitive cognition', against the abstractive view
[Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
|
|
3943
|
If existence is perceived directly, by which sense; if indirectly, how is it inferred from direct perception?
[Berkeley]
|
|
23662
|
The existence of ideas is no more obvious than the existence of external objects
[Reid]
|
|
14866
|
It always remains possible that the world just is the way it appears
[Nietzsche]
|
|
21537
|
I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations'
[Russell]
|
|
5377
|
'Acquaintance' is direct awareness, without inferences or judgements
[Russell]
|
|
22160
|
Our relationship to a hammer strengthens when we use
[Heidegger]
|
|
5678
|
Scientific direct realism says we know some properties of objects directly
[Dancy,J]
|
|
5681
|
Maybe we are forced from direct into indirect realism by the need to explain perceptual error
[Dancy,J]
|
|
6549
|
I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects
[Lycan]
|
|
6355
|
Direct realism says justification is partly a function of pure perceptual states, not of beliefs
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
|
6643
|
'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality
[Lowe]
|
|
19526
|
Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances?
[Williamson]
|
|
16374
|
There is a continuum from acquaintance to description in knowledge, depending on the link
[Recanati]
|
|
8417
|
Direct realism is false, because defeasibility questions are essential to perceptual knowledge
[Galloway]
|