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Full Idea
But for our acquaintance with the contents of our own minds, we should be unable to imagine the minds of others, and therefore we could never arrive at the knowledge that they have minds.
Gist of Idea
If we didn't know our own minds by introspection, we couldn't know that other people have minds
Source
Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5)
Book Ref
Russell,Bertrand: 'The Problems of Philosophy' [OUP 1995], p.27
A Reaction
Not only does this depend on the notorious 'argument from analogy', but it actually strikes me as false. If a robot observed a human to be writhing in pain, it would be mystified, until it inferred that we have minds in which we actually 'feel' damage.
| 3537 | I judge others' feeling by analogy with my body and behaviour [Mill] |
| 5379 | If we didn't know our own minds by introspection, we couldn't know that other people have minds [Russell] |
| 5663 | It is irresponsible to generalise from my own case of pain to other people's [Wittgenstein] |
| 19272 | To imagine another's pain by my own, I must imagine a pain I don't feel, by one I do feel [Wittgenstein] |
| 14644 | If my conception of pain derives from me, it is a contradiction to speak of another's pain [Malcolm] |
| 9282 | I can only apply consciousness predicates to myself if I can apply them to others [Strawson,P] |
| 15495 | Analogy works, as when we eat food which others seem to be relishing [Martin,CB] |
| 3457 | Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation [Searle] |
| 2757 | The argument from analogy rests on one instance alone [Dancy,J] |
| 2758 | You can't separate mind and behaviour, as the analogy argument attempts [Dancy,J] |
| 7091 | The argument from analogy is not a strong inference, since the other being might be an actor or a robot [Grayling] |
| 3538 | Analogy to other minds is uncheckable, over-confident and chauvinistic [Maslin] |