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Single Idea 5380

[filed under theme 16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection ]

Full Idea

When I am acquainted with 'my seeing the sun', it seems plain that on the one hand there is the sense-datum which represents the sun to me, on the other hand there is that which sees this sense-datum.

Gist of Idea

In perceiving the sun, I am aware of sun sense-data, and of the perceiver of the data

Source

Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5)

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'The Problems of Philosophy' [OUP 1995], p.27


A Reaction

This appears to flatly contradict Hume's scepticism about seeing his 'self', but maybe Russell is only aware of his body, and then fictionalises a 'self' as the controller of this body. But I agree with Russell. I am the thing that cares about the sun.


The 23 ideas with the same theme [what may be unknowable by introspection]:

Like the eye, the soul has no power to see itself, but sees other things [Cicero]
Introspection always discovers perceptions, and never a Self without perceptions [Hume]
I have no cognition of myself as I am, but only as I appear to myself [Kant]
Introspection is pure illusion; we can obviously observe everything except ourselves [Comte]
A cognitive mechanism wanting to know itself is absurd! [Nietzsche]
'Know thyself' is impossible and ridiculous [Nietzsche]
We think each thought causes the next, unaware of the hidden struggle beneath [Nietzsche]
Freud and others have shown that we don't know our own beliefs, feelings, motive and attitudes [Freud, by Shoemaker]
Most of us are too close to our own motives to understand them [Fry]
In perceiving the sun, I am aware of sun sense-data, and of the perceiver of the data [Russell]
When we are unreflective (as when chasing a tram) there is no 'I' [Sartre]
The Ego never appears except when we are not looking for it [Sartre]
Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you [Ryle]
We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle]
We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences [Ayer]
Sartre says the ego is 'opaque'; I prefer to say that it is 'transparent' [Chisholm]
I cannot observe my own subjectivity [Searle]
We often can't decide what emotion, or even sensation, we are experiencing [Kim]
How do we distinguish our anger from embarrassment? [Kim]
Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee]
We can't introspect ourselves as objects, because that would involve possible error [Cassam]
It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation [Lowe]
I'm not the final authority on my understanding of maths [Maslin]