more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
When I see the sun, it does not seem necessary to suppose that we are acquainted with a more or less permanent person, but we must be acquainted with that thing which sees the sun and has acquaintance with sense-data.
Gist of Idea
In seeing the sun, we are acquainted with our self, but not as a permanent person
Source
Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5)
Book Ref
Russell,Bertrand: 'The Problems of Philosophy' [OUP 1995], p.28
A Reaction
I think this is exactly right. I personally believe that I have a very clear personal identity as I write this, but I do not believe that there is a strict identity with the person who wrote similar comments three years ago. So how do I change 'my' mind?
Related Idea
Idea 22019 Consciousness of an object always entails awareness of the self [Fichte]
| 22019 | Consciousness of an object always entails awareness of the self [Fichte] |
| 5381 | In seeing the sun, we are acquainted with our self, but not as a permanent person [Russell] |
| 7106 | The Ego is not formally or materially part of consciousness, but is outside in the world [Sartre] |
| 9264 | Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
| 9266 | A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
| 4881 | Being a person must involve having second-order beliefs and desires (about beliefs and desires) [Dennett] |
| 2506 | If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them! [Fodor] |
| 3223 | Self-consciousness may just be nested intentionality [Rey] |
| 20589 | Maybe a person's true self is their second-order desires [Tuckness/Wolf] |