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Single Idea 5387
[filed under theme 19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
]
Full Idea
It is a matter of chance which characteristics of a man's appearance will come into a friend's mind when he thinks of Bismarck; thus the description in the friend's mind is accidental; he knows the various descriptions all apply to the same entity.
Gist of Idea
It is pure chance which descriptions in a person's mind make a name apply to an individual
Source
Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5)
Book Ref
Russell,Bertrand: 'The Problems of Philosophy' [OUP 1995], p.30
A Reaction
This seems to be an internalist account of reference, later called the 'bundle' theory of reference and associated with John Searle. It was attacked by Kripke. Personally I side, unfashionably, with Russell.
The
25 ideas
with the same theme
[reference is fixed by a description]:
15155
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Expressions always give ways of thinking of referents, rather than the referents themselves
[Frege, by Soames]
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5387
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It is pure chance which descriptions in a person's mind make a name apply to an individual
[Russell]
|
10448
|
If an expression can refer to anything, it may still instrinsically refer, but relative to a context
[Bach on Strawson,P]
|
6268
|
The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions
[Putnam]
|
6389
|
To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically
[Davidson]
|
16988
|
Descriptive reference shows how to refer, how to identify two things, and how to challenge existence
[Kripke, by PG]
|
17029
|
It can't be necessary that Aristotle had the properties commonly attributed to him
[Kripke]
|
17032
|
Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel'
[Kripke]
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10435
|
A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F
[Donnellan, by Sainsbury]
|
10451
|
Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic
[Bach on Donnellan]
|
5813
|
A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed
[Donnellan]
|
9039
|
If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit
[Evans]
|
14209
|
Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications)
[Lewis]
|
10439
|
What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives?
[Bach]
|
10441
|
If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties
[Bach]
|
10442
|
We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description
[Bach]
|
10445
|
It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description
[Bach]
|
10457
|
Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential
[Bach]
|
10463
|
Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it
[Bach]
|
16348
|
Descriptivism says we mentally relate to objects through their properties
[Recanati]
|
16384
|
Definite descriptions reveal either a predicate (attributive use) or the file it belongs in (referential)
[Recanati]
|
16352
|
A rigid definite description can be attributive, not referential: 'the actual F, whoever he is….'
[Recanati]
|
16353
|
Singularity cannot be described, and it needs actual world relations
[Recanati]
|
16355
|
Problems with descriptivism are reference by perception, by communications and by indexicals
[Recanati]
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22245
|
A linguistic expression refers to what its associated mental file refers to
[Recanati]
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