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Full Idea
We think of things existing when they are in time (though possibly at all times), but universals do not exist in this sense, so we shall say that they 'subsist' or 'have being'.
Gist of Idea
Normal existence is in time, so we must say that universals 'subsist'
Source
Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9)
Book Ref
Russell,Bertrand: 'The Problems of Philosophy' [OUP 1995], p.57
A Reaction
Russell picked up the word 'subsist' from medieval philosophy. This idea brings the full Platonic metaphysics with it, which is tricky, to say the least. But what can you do? Admitting the content of thought brings baggage with it.
| 22125 | Duns Scotus was a realist about universals [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| 5409 | Normal existence is in time, so we must say that universals 'subsist' [Russell] |
| 4446 | It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately [Armstrong] |
| 15729 | Uninstantiated properties must be defined using the instantiated ones [Quinton] |
| 8499 | Nominalists cannot translate 'red resembles pink more than blue' into particulars [Jackson] |
| 7962 | Uninstantiated properties are useful in philosophy [Oliver] |
| 10727 | Uninstantiated universals seem to exist if they themselves have properties [Oliver] |
| 8962 | 'There are shapes which are never exemplified' is the toughest example for nominalists [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz] |
| 8307 | Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables [Lowe] |
| 4452 | Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties [Moreland] |
| 4467 | A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary [Moreland] |
| 4469 | There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself [Moreland] |
| 4468 | How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space? [Moreland] |