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Single Idea 5410

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance ]

Full Idea

If I see simultaneously two shades of green, I can see that they resemble each other, and I see that they resemble each other more than they resemble a shade of red; in this way I become acquainted with the universal 'resemblance'.

Gist of Idea

I learn the universal 'resemblance' by seeing two shades of green, and their contrast with red

Source

Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.10)

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'The Problems of Philosophy' [OUP 1995], p.59


A Reaction

This is strikingly different from the account of Hume, who seemed to regard resemblance as a fairly mechanical, computer-like activity of the brain, whereas Russell (an empiricist) responds by inclining towards Platonism. Hume sounds better here.


The 12 ideas with the same theme [seeing recurrences of properties and structures]:

Everything resembles everything else up to a point [Plato]
General ideas are the connection by resemblance to some particular [Hume]
Hume does not distinguish real resemblances among degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume]
A picture of a friend strengthens our idea of him, by resemblance [Hume]
Hume needs a notion which includes degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume]
We don't recognise comparisons by something in our minds; the concepts result from the comparisons [Mill]
I learn the universal 'resemblance' by seeing two shades of green, and their contrast with red [Russell]
General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine]
To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine]
Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine]
Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine]
The different types of resemblance don't resemble one another [Fodor]