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Single Idea 5427
[filed under theme 18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
]
Full Idea
Judging or believing is a certain complex unity of which a mind is a constituent; if the remaining constituents, taken in the order which they have in the belief, form a complex unity, then the belief is true.
Gist of Idea
Truth is when a mental state corresponds to a complex unity of external constituents
Source
Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12)
Book Ref
Russell,Bertrand: 'The Problems of Philosophy' [OUP 1995], p.74
A Reaction
The modern label of 'congruence' for this view of truth makes it clearer. We aim to get a complex unity of constituents in our minds which are in the same 'order' as the constituents in the world. It is a good proposal, but leaves 'facts' as a problem.
The
20 ideas
with the same theme
[how we evaluate truth and falsehood]:
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6594
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Stoics said that correct judgement needs an invincible criterion of truth
[Stoic school, by Fogelin]
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1884
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If we utter three steps of a logical argument, they never exist together
[Sext.Empiricus]
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22108
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First grasp what it is, then its essential features; judgement is their compounding and division
[Aquinas]
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22061
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Judgement is distinguishing concepts, and seeing their relations
[Fichte, by Siep]
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18265
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We don't judge by combining subject and concept; we get a concept by splitting up a judgement
[Frege]
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21725
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The multiple relations theory says assertions about propositions are about their ingredients
[Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B]
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23474
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A judgement is a complex entity, of mind and various objects
[Russell/Whitehead]
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23455
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The meaning of 'Socrates is human' is completed by a judgement
[Russell/Whitehead]
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23480
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The multiple relation theory of judgement couldn't explain the unity of sentences
[Morris,M on Russell/Whitehead]
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18275
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Only the act of judging completes the meaning of a statement
[Russell/Whitehead]
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5375
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Knowledge of truths applies to judgements; knowledge by acquaintance applies to sensations and things
[Russell]
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21711
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Russell's 'multiple relations' theory says beliefs attach to ingredients, not to propositions
[Russell, by Linsky,B]
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5427
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Truth is when a mental state corresponds to a complex unity of external constituents
[Russell]
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17613
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We should judge principles by the science, not science by some fixed principles
[Zermelo]
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13980
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If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment?
[Ryle]
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7535
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If all beliefs are propositional, then belief and judgement are the same thing
[Monk]
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12608
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Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality
[Peacocke]
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22273
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Traditionally there are twelve categories of judgement, in groups of three
[Potter]
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13239
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Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject
[Beall/Restall]
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23554
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Judgements can be unreflective and non-inferential, yet rational, by being sensitive to experience
[Fricker,M]
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