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Single Idea 5429

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem ]

Full Idea

A true belief is not knowledge when it is deduced from a false belief (as when deducing that the late Prime Minister's name began with B, believing it was Balfour, when actually it was Bannerman).

Gist of Idea

True belief is not knowledge when it is deduced from false belief

Source

Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.13)

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'The Problems of Philosophy' [OUP 1995], p.76

A Reaction

Correct me if I am wrong, but isn't this the 'Gettier Problem'? It raises the central question of modern epistemology, which is what will be counted as adequate justification to make a true belief qualify as knowledge. How high do we set the bar?

The 13 ideas with the same theme [mere true justified belief doesn't ensure knowledge]:

6444 True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell]
5430 A true belief is not knowledge if it is reached by bad reasoning [Russell]
5429 True belief is not knowledge when it is deduced from false belief [Russell]
8886 Being a true justified belief is not a sufficient condition for knowledge [Gettier]
20225 For internalists Gettier situations are where internally it is fine, but there is an external mishap [Zagzebski]
20226 Gettier problems are always possible if justification and truth are not closely linked [Zagzebski]
20228 We avoid the Gettier problem if the support for the belief entails its truth [Zagzebski]
20227 Gettier cases arise when good luck cancels out bad luck [Zagzebski]
19004 Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true [Yablo]
19699 A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington]
19728 Gettier and lottery cases seem to involve luck, meaning bad connection of beliefs to facts [Black,T]
19266 In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya]
19260 Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya]