more from this thinker
|
more from this text
Single Idea 5444
[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
]
Full Idea
The new essentialism retains Aristotelian ideas about essential properties, but it distinguishes more clearly between 'individual essences' and 'kind essences'; the former define a particular individual, the latter what kind it belongs to.
Gist of Idea
'Individual essences' fix a particular individual, and 'kind essences' fix the kind it belongs to
Source
Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.1)
Book Ref
Ellis,Brian: 'The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism' [Acumen 2002], p.12
A Reaction
This might actually come into conflict with Aristotle, who seems to think that my personal essence is largely a human nature I share with everyone else. The new distinction is trying to keep the Kantian individual on the stage.
The
17 ideas
with the same theme
[distinctions about how essence should be understood]:
11237
|
Only universals have essence
[Plato, by Politis]
|
12099
|
Aristotelian essences are causal, not classificatory
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
15036
|
An essence can either be universal (in the mind) or singular (in concrete particulars)
[Avicenna, by Panaccio]
|
11203
|
Specific individual essence is defined by material, and generic essence is defined by form
[Aquinas]
|
22126
|
Avicenna and Duns Scotus say essences have independent and prior existence
[Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
|
16038
|
Locke may distinguish real essence from internal constitution, claiming the latter is knowable
[Locke, by Jones,J-E]
|
5444
|
'Individual essences' fix a particular individual, and 'kind essences' fix the kind it belongs to
[Ellis]
|
5450
|
For Kripke, essence is origin; for Putnam, essence is properties; for Wiggins, essence is membership of a kind
[Kripke, by Mautner]
|
14656
|
Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them?
[Plantinga]
|
12066
|
Aristotelian and Kripkean essentialism are very different theories
[Witt]
|
11152
|
Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties
[Fine,K]
|
14256
|
How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences?
[Fine,K]
|
14258
|
Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties
[Fine,K]
|
15184
|
Causal reference presupposes essentialism if it refers to modally extended entities
[Sidelle]
|
15681
|
Essentialism: real or representational? sortal, causal or ideal? real particulars, or placeholders?
[Gelman]
|
14190
|
Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual
[Paul,LA]
|
17313
|
Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times
[Koslicki]
|