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Single Idea 5444
[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
]
Full Idea
The new essentialism retains Aristotelian ideas about essential properties, but it distinguishes more clearly between 'individual essences' and 'kind essences'; the former define a particular individual, the latter what kind it belongs to.
Gist of Idea
'Individual essences' fix a particular individual, and 'kind essences' fix the kind it belongs to
Source
Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.1)
Book Ref
Ellis,Brian: 'The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism' [Acumen 2002], p.12
A Reaction
This might actually come into conflict with Aristotle, who seems to think that my personal essence is largely a human nature I share with everyone else. The new distinction is trying to keep the Kantian individual on the stage.
The
107 ideas
from Brian Ellis
6616
|
Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence
[Ellis]
|
6612
|
Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties
[Ellis]
|
6615
|
A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus
[Ellis]
|
6614
|
A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws
[Ellis]
|
6613
|
The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations
[Ellis]
|
23781
|
Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes
[Ellis, by Williams,NE]
|
12665
|
I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers
[Ellis]
|
12667
|
Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability
[Ellis]
|
12666
|
We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation
[Ellis]
|
12668
|
Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true
[Ellis]
|
12669
|
Science aims to explain things, not just describe them
[Ellis]
|
12670
|
A physical event is any change of distribution of energy
[Ellis]
|
12673
|
Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act
[Ellis]
|
12672
|
Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals
[Ellis]
|
12671
|
I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal
[Ellis]
|
12674
|
Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism
[Ellis]
|
12675
|
Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave
[Ellis]
|
12680
|
Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level
[Ellis]
|
12682
|
Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions
[Ellis]
|
12684
|
Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal
[Ellis]
|
12676
|
Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power
[Ellis]
|
12683
|
Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes
[Ellis]
|
12679
|
A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties
[Ellis]
|
12681
|
There are natural kinds of processes
[Ellis]
|
12685
|
Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent
[Ellis]
|
12686
|
Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties
[Ellis]
|
12687
|
Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things
[Ellis]
|
12688
|
Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things
[Ellis]
|
12689
|
Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang
[Ellis]
|
12690
|
The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang
[Ellis]
|
5445
|
Essentialists regard inanimate objects as genuine causal agents
[Ellis]
|
5442
|
For 'passivists' behaviour is imposed on things from outside
[Ellis]
|
5443
|
Kripke and others have made essentialism once again respectable
[Ellis]
|
5444
|
'Individual essences' fix a particular individual, and 'kind essences' fix the kind it belongs to
[Ellis]
|
5448
|
'Real essence' makes it what it is; 'nominal essence' makes us categorise it a certain way
[Ellis]
|
5447
|
Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the essences of things
[Ellis]
|
5446
|
For essentialists two members of a natural kind must be identical
[Ellis]
|
5459
|
Essentialists say dispositions are basic, rather than supervenient on matter and natural laws
[Ellis]
|
5461
|
The essence of uranium is its atomic number and its electron shell
[Ellis]
|
5460
|
Causal relations cannot be reduced to regularities, as they could occur just once
[Ellis]
|
5453
|
Essentialists mostly accept the primary/secondary qualities distinction
[Ellis]
|
5457
|
Predicates assert properties, values, denials, relations, conventions, existence and fabrications
[Ellis, by PG]
|
5462
|
Essential properties are usually quantitatively determinate
[Ellis]
|
5456
|
Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent
[Ellis]
|
5458
|
Nearly all fundamental properties of physics are dispositional
[Ellis]
|
5469
|
The passive view of nature says categorical properties are basic, but others say dispositions
[Ellis]
|
5468
|
Properties are 'dispositional', or 'categorical' (the latter as 'block' or 'intrinsic' structures)
[Ellis, by PG]
|
5466
|
Primary qualities are number, figure, size, texture, motion, configuration, impenetrability and (?) mass
[Ellis]
|
5463
|
Essentialists believe causation is necessary, resulting from dispositions and circumstances
[Ellis]
|
5464
|
For essentialists, laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, being based on essences of natural kinds
[Ellis]
|
5471
|
Essentialism says natural kinds are fundamental to nature, and determine the laws
[Ellis]
|
5473
|
The laws of nature imitate the hierarchy of natural kinds
[Ellis]
|
5474
|
Laws of nature tend to describe ideal things, or ideal circumstances
[Ellis]
|
5475
|
We must explain the necessity, idealisation, ontology and structure of natural laws
[Ellis]
|
5472
|
Natural kinds are of objects/substances, or events/processes, or intrinsic natures
[Ellis]
|
5476
|
Essentialists say natural laws are in a new category: necessary a posteriori
[Ellis]
|
5477
|
One thing can look like something else, without being the something else
[Ellis]
|
5478
|
Imagination tests what is possible for all we know, not true possibility
[Ellis]
|
5479
|
Scientific essentialists say science should define the limits of the possible
[Ellis]
|
5480
|
The whole of our world is a natural kind, so all worlds like it necessarily have the same laws
[Ellis]
|
5487
|
Essentialism requires a clear separation of semantics, epistemology and ontology
[Ellis]
|
5491
|
A general theory of causation is only possible in an area if natural kinds are involved
[Ellis]
|
5483
|
Essentialists deny possible worlds, and say possibilities are what is compatible with the actual world
[Ellis]
|
5482
|
Possible worlds realism is only needed to give truth conditions for modals and conditionals
[Ellis]
|
5485
|
Emeralds are naturally green, and only an external force could turn them blue
[Ellis]
|
5484
|
Essentialists don't infer from some to all, but from essences to necessary behaviour
[Ellis]
|
5488
|
Regularity theories of causation cannot give an account of human agency
[Ellis]
|
5489
|
Humans have variable dispositions, and also power to change their dispositions
[Ellis]
|
5490
|
Essentialism fits in with Darwinism, but not with extreme politics of left or right
[Ellis]
|
5486
|
Essentialism says metaphysics can't be done by analysing unreliable language
[Ellis]
|
5481
|
Properties have powers; they aren't just ways for logicians to classify objects
[Ellis]
|
18398
|
Space, time, and some other basics, are not causal powers
[Ellis]
|
13568
|
Basic powers may not be explained by structure, if at the bottom level there is no structure
[Ellis]
|
13567
|
Ontology should give insight into or an explanation of the world revealed by science
[Ellis]
|
13569
|
To give essentialist explanations there have to be natural kinds
[Ellis]
|
13570
|
Individual essences necessitate that individual; natural kind essences necessitate kind membership
[Ellis]
|
13571
|
Scientific essentialism doesn't really need Kripkean individual essences
[Ellis]
|
13566
|
A proton must have its causal role, because without it it wouldn't be a proton
[Ellis]
|
13572
|
There are 'substantive' (objects of some kind), 'dynamic' (events of some kind) and 'property' universals
[Ellis]
|
13573
|
Universals are all types of natural kind
[Ellis]
|
13574
|
Natural kinds are distinguished by resting on essences
[Ellis]
|
13575
|
If there are borderline cases between natural kinds, that makes them superficial
[Ellis]
|
13576
|
Necessities are distinguished by their grounds, not their different modalities
[Ellis]
|
13577
|
Typical 'categorical' properties are spatio-temporal, such as shape
[Ellis]
|
13578
|
The old idea that identity depends on essence and behaviour is rejected by the empiricists
[Ellis]
|
13579
|
What is most distinctive of scientific essentialism is regarding processes as natural kinds
[Ellis]
|
13581
|
Scientific essentialism is more concerned with explanation than with identity (Locke, not Kripke)
[Ellis]
|
13580
|
Causal powers must necessarily act the way they do
[Ellis]
|
13582
|
'Being a methane molecule' is not a property - it is just a predicate
[Ellis]
|
13583
|
There might be uninstantiated natural kinds, such as transuranic elements which have never occurred
[Ellis]
|
13584
|
The extension of a property is a contingent fact, so cannot be the essence of the property
[Ellis]
|
13585
|
The most fundamental properties of nature (mass, charge, spin ...) all seem to be dispositions
[Ellis]
|
13586
|
Maybe dispositions can be explained by intrinsic properties or structures
[Ellis]
|
13587
|
There is no property of 'fragility', as things are each fragile in a distinctive way
[Ellis]
|
13596
|
A causal power is a disposition to produce forces
[Ellis]
|
13595
|
Laws don't exist in the world; they are true of the world
[Ellis]
|
13594
|
The ontological fundamentals are dispositions, and also categorical (spatio-temporal and structural) properties
[Ellis]
|
13599
|
Powers are dispositions of the essences of kinds that involve them in causation
[Ellis]
|
13598
|
Causal powers are often directional (e.g. centripetal, centrifugal, circulatory)
[Ellis]
|
13597
|
Good explanations unify
[Ellis]
|
13600
|
The point of models in theories is not to idealise, but to focus on what is essential
[Ellis]
|
13601
|
Explanations of particular events are not essentialist, as they don't reveal essential structures
[Ellis]
|
13604
|
Real possibility and necessity has the logic of S5, which links equivalence classes of worlds of the same kind
[Ellis]
|
13603
|
A primary aim of science is to show the limits of the possible
[Ellis]
|
9436
|
The property of 'being an electron' is not of anything, and only electrons could have it
[Ellis]
|
13606
|
Humean conceptions of reality drive the adoption of extensional logic
[Ellis]
|
13607
|
If events are unconnected, then induction cannot be solved
[Ellis]
|