more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 5450

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence ]

Full Idea

Kripke makes the origin of an organism essential to it, according to Putnam the fundamental physical properties of a thing are essential, Wiggins sees an organism's essence in belonging to a particular kind, etc.

Gist of Idea

For Kripke, essence is origin; for Putnam, essence is properties; for Wiggins, essence is membership of a kind

Source

report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by Thomas Mautner - Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy p.179

Book Ref

Mautner,Thomas: 'Dictionary of Philosophy' [Penguin 1997], p.179


A Reaction

This is helpful for seeing where the problems remain, if you embrace essentialism (as I feel inclined to do). It is vital to remember Putnam's point, that we could suddenly discover that cats are alien robots. This seems to undermine Kripke and Wiggins.


The 17 ideas with the same theme [distinctions about how essence should be understood]:

Only universals have essence [Plato, by Politis]
Aristotelian essences are causal, not classificatory [Aristotle, by Witt]
An essence can either be universal (in the mind) or singular (in concrete particulars) [Avicenna, by Panaccio]
Specific individual essence is defined by material, and generic essence is defined by form [Aquinas]
Avicenna and Duns Scotus say essences have independent and prior existence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
Locke may distinguish real essence from internal constitution, claiming the latter is knowable [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
'Individual essences' fix a particular individual, and 'kind essences' fix the kind it belongs to [Ellis]
For Kripke, essence is origin; for Putnam, essence is properties; for Wiggins, essence is membership of a kind [Kripke, by Mautner]
Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga]
Aristotelian and Kripkean essentialism are very different theories [Witt]
Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K]
How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K]
Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K]
Causal reference presupposes essentialism if it refers to modally extended entities [Sidelle]
Essentialism: real or representational? sortal, causal or ideal? real particulars, or placeholders? [Gelman]
Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki]