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Single Idea 5458

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions ]

Full Idea

With few, if any, exceptions, the fundamental properties of physical theory are dispositional properties of the things that have them.

Clarification

'Dispositions' are tendencies to behave in a certain way

Gist of Idea

Nearly all fundamental properties of physics are dispositional

Source

Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.3)

Book Ref

Ellis,Brian: 'The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism' [Acumen 2002], p.47


A Reaction

He is denying that they are passive (as Locke saw primary qualities), and says they are actively causal, or else capacities or propensities. Sounds right to me.


The 25 ideas with the same theme [idea of a disposition towards certain behaviour]:

In the 17th century, 'disposition' usually just means the spatial arrangement of parts [Boyle, by Pasnau]
Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman]
Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine]
Either dispositions rest on structures, or we keep saying 'all things being equal' [Quine]
Dispositions in action can be destroyed, be recovered, or remain unchanged [Martin,CB]
To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong]
Nearly all fundamental properties of physics are dispositional [Ellis]
The most fundamental properties of nature (mass, charge, spin ...) all seem to be dispositions [Ellis]
Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker]
We can bring dispositions into existence, as in creating an identifier [Dennett, by Mumford]
Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world [Molnar]
Are a property's dispositions built in, or contingently added? [Heil]
Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford]
Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford]
Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford]
Dispositionality is a natural selection function, picking outcomes from the range of possibilities [Mumford/Anjum]
Instead of adding Aristotelian forms to physical stuff, one could add dispositions [Pasnau]
I have an 'iterated ability' to learn the violin - that is, the ability to acquire that ability [Vetter]
Dispositions have directed behaviour which occurs if triggered [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
'Masked' dispositions fail to react because something intervenes [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
A disposition is 'altered' when the stimulus reverses the disposition [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
A disposition is 'mimicked' if a different cause produces that effect from that stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
A 'trick' can look like a stimulus for a disposition which will happen without it [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
Some dispositions manifest themselves without a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
We could analyse dispositions as 'possibilities', with no mention of a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]